Cryptovirology: extortion-based security threats and countermeasures
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Traditionally, cryptography and its applications are defensive in nature, and provide privacy, authentication, and security to users. In this paper we present the idea of Cryptovirology which employs a twist on cryptography, showing that it can also be used offensively. By being offensive we mean that it can be used to mount extortion based attacks that cause loss of access to information, loss of confidentiality, and information leakage, tasks which cryptography typically prevents. In this paper we analyze potential threats and attacks that rogue use of cryptography can cause when combined with rogue software (viruses, Trojan horses), and demonstrate them experimentally by presenting an implementation of a cryptovirus that we have tested (we took careful precautions in the process to insure that the virus remained contained). Public-key cryptography is essential to the attacks that we demonstrate (which we call "cryptovirological attacks"). We also suggest countermeasures and mechanisms to cope with and prevent such attacks. These attacks have implications on how the use of cryptographic tools should be managed and audited in general purpose computing environments, and imply that access to cryptographic tools should be well controlled. The experimental virus demonstrates how cryptographic packages can be condensed into a small space, which may have independent applications (e.g., cryptographic module design in small mobile devices).
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Citations
Cites
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359340.359342 · Cited by 13,462
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Elgamal, T. (1985) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1985.1057074 · Cited by 8,059
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“Seven years after this incident, researchers explained the faults of the PC Cyborg and outlined the emergence of a new cryptovirology concept [196].”
BackgroundHelDroid: Dissecting and Detecting Mobile Ransomware
Andronio, N., Zanero, S., & Maggi, F. (2015) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-26362-5_18 · Cited by 246
Sextortion Among Adolescents: Results From a National Survey of U.S. Youth
Patchin, J. W., & Hinduja, S. (2020) · Sexual Abuse · doi:10.1177/1079063218800469 · Cited by 219
“…in politics (Jacoby, Nehemkis, & Eells, 1977; McChesney, 1997; Stanley, 2010), gangs (Chin, 2000; Spergel, 1992), and cybersecurity (Cárdenas, Amin, & Sastry, 2008; Salvi & Kerkar, 2016; A. Young & Yung, 1996), it is the workplace connotation that seems most relevant to the current discussion.”
BackgroundMcIntosh, T., Kayes, A. S. M., Chen, Y.-P. P., Ng, A., & Watters, P. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3479393 · Cited by 146
Dynamic ransomware protection using deterministic random bit generator
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Metadata
- Authors
- Young, A., & Yung, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc. Press
- Published
- 2002-12-23
- Pages
- 129-140
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4248806346
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 1.36
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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