The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Malicious Data Attacks on Smart Grid State Estimation: Attack Strategies and Countermeasures
Abstract
The problem of constructing malicious data attack of smart grid state estimation is considered together with countermeasures that detect the presence of such attacks. For the adversary, using a graph theoretic approach, an efficient algorithm with polynomial-time complexity is obtained to find the minimum size unobservable malicious data attacks. When the unobservable attack does not exist due to restrictions of meter access, attacks are constructed to minimize the residue energy of attack while guaranteeing a certain level of increase of mean square error. For the control center, a computationally efficient algorithm is derived to detect and localize attacks using the generalized likelihood ratio test regularized by an L1norm penalty on the strength of attack.
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Cites
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When is the generalized likelihood ratio test optimal?
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Limiting false data attacks on power system state estimation
Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L. (2010) · Conference on Information Sciences and Systems · doi:10.1109/ciss.2010.5464816 · Cited by 147
Self-citationOn malicious data attacks on power system state estimation
Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L. (2010) · Cited by 73
Self-citationKosut, O. (2010) · eCommons (Cornell University) · Cited by 5
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Cited by
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
Liu, Y., Ning, P., & Reiter, M. K. (2011) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1952982.1952995 · Cited by 2,428
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
Liu, Y., Ning, P., & Reiter, M. K. (2009) · Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653666 · Cited by 1,285
A secure control framework for resource-limited adversaries
Teixeira, A., Shames, I., Sandberg, H., & Johansson, K. H. (2015) · Automatica · doi:10.1016/j.automatica.2014.10.067 · Cited by 1,187
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges
Wang, W., & Lu, Z. (2013) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2012.12.017 · Cited by 1,123
Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid
Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2011.2163807 · Cited by 784
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L.
- Venue
- 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2010-10
- Pages
- 220-225
- OpenAlex
- W2033939184
- Cited by
- 348
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 46.12
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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