The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
Abstract
Tor is the second generation onion router supporting the anonymous transport of TCP streams over the Internet. Its low latency makes it very suitable for common tasks, such as Web browsing, but insecure against traffic-analysis attacks by a global passive adversary. We present new traffic-analysis techniques that allow adversaries with only a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by Tor. Furthermore, we show that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator Our attack is feasible for the adversary anticipated by the Tor designers. Our theoretical attacks are backed up by experiments performed on the deployed, albeit experimental, Tor network. Our techniques should also be applicable to any low latency anonymous network. These attacks highlight the relationship between the field of traffic-analysis and more traditional computer security issues, such as covert channel analysis. Our research also highlights that the inability to directly observe network links does not prevent an attacker from performing traffic-analysis: the adversary can use the anonymising network as an oracle to infer the traffic load on remote nodes in order to perform traffic-analysis.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
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Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks
Panchenko, A., Niessen, L., Zinnen, A., & Engel, T. (2011) · Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society · doi:10.1145/2046556.2046570 · Cited by 501
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A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Juarez, M., Afroz, S., Acar, G., Diaz, C., & Greenstadt, R. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660368 · Cited by 327
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Bauer, K., McCoy, D., Grunwald, D., Kohno, T., & Sicker, D. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society · doi:10.1145/1314333.1314336 · Cited by 314
Metadata
- Authors
- Murdoch, S. J., & Danezis, G.
- Venue
- 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2005-05-24
- Pages
- 183-195
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2127295197
- Cited by
- 517
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 15.03
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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