A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent studies on Website Fingerprinting (WF) claim to have found highly effective attacks on Tor. However, these studies make assumptions about user settings, adversary capabilities, and the nature of the Web that do not necessarily hold in practical scenarios. The following study critically evaluates these assumptions by conducting the attack where the assumptions do not hold. We show that certain variables, for example, user's browsing habits, differences in location and version of Tor Browser Bundle, that are usually omitted from the current WF model have a significant impact on the efficacy of the attack. We also empirically show how prior work succumbs to the base rate fallacy in the open-world scenario. We address this problem by augmenting our classification method with a verification step. We conclude that even though this approach reduces the number of false positives over 63\%, it does not completely solve the problem, which remains an open issue for WF attacks.
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Integrity signals
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“The variability of encrypted traffic due to changes in the content of Internet services [14] over time will challenge the ability of our approach with fixed patterns leaned from fixed data and keeping unchanged over time.”
From ET-BERT: A Contextualized Datagram Representation with Pre-training Transformers for Encrypted Traffic Classification (2022) · cites this paper as [14]
Citations
Cites
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“This is a form of Abstaining classification [5].”
BackgroundLow-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
Murdoch, S. J., & Danezis, G. (2005) · 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) · doi:10.1109/sp.2005.12 · Cited by 517 · cited 1×
“Using timing, frequency and length of the messages, an attacker can bypass otherwise very robust security mechanisms and identify the communicating parties [7, 22].”
BackgroundWebsite fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks
Panchenko, A., Niessen, L., Zinnen, A., & Engel, T. (2011) · Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society · doi:10.1145/2046556.2046570 · Cited by 501
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“Tor routes connections through three-hop circuits and encrypts the traffic in layers using onion routing [10], so that none of the relays can know both the origin and the destination of the communication at the same time.”
BackgroundPeek-a-Boo, I Still See You: Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail
Dyer, K. P., Coull, S. E., Ristenpart, T., & Shrimpton, T. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.28 · Cited by 456 · cited 3×
“Total time D [9] N-grams Up/Downstream bytes Bytes in traffic bursts”
BackgroundMethodHerrmann, D., Wendolsky, R., & Federrath, H. (2009) · Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security · doi:10.1145/1655008.1655013 · Cited by 424 · cited 2×
“Website fingerprinting; Tor; privacy”
InfluentialInferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Liberatore, M., & Levine, B. N. (2006) · Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1180405.1180437 · Cited by 413 · cited 1×
“Many WF studies on one-hop proxy attacks have followed [2,9, 16,18].”
BackgroundTouching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
Cai, X., Zhang, X. C., Joshi, B., & Johnson, R. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382260 · Cited by 394 · cited 5×
“Some authors have also evaluated their classifiers in an open-world scenario [3, 23, 32], where there is a set of k target pages being monitored but the user is allowed to visit pages that are not in that set.”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
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Cited by
Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Panchenko, A., Lanze, F., Zinnen, A., Henze, M., Pennekamp, J., Wehrle, K., & Engel, T. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23477 · Cited by 645
“, the one described in [14]) and is not subject to simplified assumptions made by the related work.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLin, X., Xiong, G., Gou, G., Li, Z., Shi, J., & Yu, J. (2022) · Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022 · doi:10.1145/3485447.3512217 · Cited by 599
“Generalizability: The variability of encrypted traffic due to changes in the content of Internet services [13] over time will challenge the ability of our approach with fixed patterns leaned from fixed data and keeping unchanged over time.”
BackgroundDeep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning
Sirinam, P., Imani, M., Juarez, M., & Wright, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243768 · Cited by 592
“Both Juarez et al. [19] and Wang and Goldberg [40] show that after 10-14 days, the accuracy of WF attacks goes down significantly.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationAutomated Website Fingerprinting through Deep Learning
Rimmer, V., Preuveneers, D., Juarez, M., Goethem, T. V., & Joosen, W. (2018) · Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2018.23105 · Cited by 319
“…a realistic large-scale open world setting poses a lot of issues, such as (1) the effect of the hypothesis space complexity, as shown by Panchenko et al. [25], and (2) the base rate fallacy, demonstrated by Juarez et al. [20] for monitored websites with a very low prior probabilities of visit.”
InfluentialSelf-citationMemGuard: Defending against Black-Box Membership Inference Attacks via Adversarial Examples
Jia, J., Salem, A., Backes, M., Zhang, Y., & Gong, N. Z. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363201 · Cited by 324
“, attribute inference attacks [11, 17, 28], website fingerprinting attacks [7, 22, 29, 46, 67], side-channel attacks [73], location attacks [5, 45, 52, 72], and author identification attacks [8, 41].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Juarez, M., Afroz, S., Acar, G., Diaz, C., & Greenstadt, R.
- Affiliations
- KU Leuven (BE)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
- Drexel University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2014-11-03
- Pages
- 263-274
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2120702739
- Cited by
- 327
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 46 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 8.37
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Keywords
- website fingerprinting, Tor, base rate fallacy, open-world classification, false positives, network traffic analysis
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2660267.2660368
- The paper
- Juarez, M., Afroz, S., Acar, G., Diaz, C., & Greenstadt, R. (2014). A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks. Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660368
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