The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lares: An Architecture for Secure Active Monitoring Using Virtualization
Abstract
Host-based security tools such as anti-virus and intrusion detection systems are not adequately protected on today's computers. Malware is often designed to immediately disable any security tools upon installation, rendering them useless. While current research has focused on moving these vulnerable security tools into an isolated virtual machine, this approach cripples security tools by preventing them from doing active monitoring. This paper describes an architecture that takes a hybrid approach, giving security tools the ability to do active monitoring while still benefiting from the increased security of an isolated virtual machine. We discuss the architecture and a prototype implementation that can process hooks from a virtual machine running Windows XP on Xen. We conclude with a security analysis and show the performance of a single hook to be 28 musecs in the best case.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity
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Self-citationHypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World
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HyperSentry: enabling stealthy in-context measurement of hypervisor integrity
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Metadata
- Authors
- Payne, B. D., Carbone, M., Sharif, M., & Lee, W.
- Venue
- 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2008-05
- Pages
- 233-247
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2144006591
- Cited by
- 414
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 25.80
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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