Tamper Evident Microprocessors
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Most security mechanisms proposed to date unquestioningly place trust in microprocessor hardware. This trust, however, is misplaced and dangerous because microprocessors are vulnerable to insider attacks that can catastrophically compromise security, integrity and privacy of computer systems. In this paper, we describe several methods to strengthen the fundamental assumption about trust in microprocessors. By employing practical, lightweight attack detectors within a microprocessor, we show that it is possible to protect against malicious logic embedded in microprocessor hardware. We propose and evaluate two area-efficient hardware methods - TrustNet and DataWatch - that detect attacks on microprocessor hardware by knowledgeable, malicious insiders. Our mechanisms leverage the fact that multiple components within a microprocessor (e.g., fetch, decode pipeline stage etc.) must necessarily coordinate and communicate to execute even simple instructions, and that any attack on a microprocessor must cause erroneous communications between micro architectural subcomponents used to build a processor. A key aspect of our solution is that TrustNet and DataWatch are themselves highly resilient to corruption. We demonstrate that under realistic assumptions, our solutions can protect pipelines and on-chip cache hierarchies at negligible area cost and with no performance impact. Combining TrustNet and DataWatch with prior work on fault detection has the potential to provide complete coverage against a large class of microprocessor attacks.
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Cites
Yet another MicroArchitectural Attack: exploiting I-Cache
Aciiçmez, O. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture · doi:10.1145/1314466.1314469 · Cited by 232
Cited by
Hardware Trojan attacks: Threat analysis and countermeasures
Bhunia, S., Hsiao, M. S., Banga, M., & Narasimhan, S. (2014) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2014.2334493 · Cited by 766
FANCI: identification of stealthy malicious logic using boolean functional analysis
Waksman, A., Suozzo, M., & Sethumadhavan, S. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security - CCS '13 · doi:10.1145/2508859.2516654 · Cited by 363
Self-citationRobotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P. A., Noura, H. N., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2022) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-021-00545-8 · Cited by 320
“This includes isolating Internet Protocol (IP) cores mechanisms [242], along with implementing solutions for payload detection [243], and the implementation of the Integrated Circuit (IC) fingerprinting technique [244].”
Cybersecurity issues in robotics
Clark, G. W., Doran, M. V., & Andel, T. R. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA) · doi:10.1109/cogsima.2017.7929597 · Cited by 92
Metadata
- Authors
- Waksman, A., & Sethumadhavan, S.
- Venue
- 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2010
- Pages
- 173-188
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1988712140
- Cited by
- 87
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.20
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Waksman, A., & Sethumadhavan, S. (2010). Tamper Evident Microprocessors. 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2010.19
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