The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: A Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow
Abstract
With software-as-a-service becoming mainstream, more and more applications are delivered to the client through the Web. Unlike a desktop application, a web application is split into browser-side and server-side components. A subset of the application's internal information flows are inevitably exposed on the network. We show that despite encryption, such a side-channel information leak is a realistic and serious threat to user privacy. Specifically, we found that surprisingly detailed sensitive information is being leaked out from a number of high-profile, top-of-the-line web applications in healthcare, taxation, investment and web search: an eavesdropper can infer the illnesses/medications/surgeries of the user, her family income and investment secrets, despite HTTPS protection; a stranger on the street can glean enterprise employees' web search queries, despite WPA/WPA2 Wi-Fi encryption. More importantly, the root causes of the problem are some fundamental characteristics of web applications: stateful communication, low entropy input for better interaction, and significant traffic distinctions. As a result, the scope of the problem seems industry-wide. We further present a concrete analysis to demonstrate the challenges of mitigating such a threat, which points to the necessity of a disciplined engineering practice for side-channel mitigations in future web application developments.
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Cites
Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds
Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2009) · Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653687 · Cited by 2,053
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Brumley, D., & Boneh, D. (2005) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2005.01.010 · Cited by 871
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Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol
Wagner, D. A., & Schneier, B. (1996) · Cited by 486
Statistical identification of encrypted Web browsing traffic
Sun, Q., Simon, D. R., Wang, Y.-M., Russell, W., Padmanabhan, V. N., & Qiu, L. (2005) · Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004359 · Cited by 377
Privacy Vulnerabilities in Encrypted HTTP Streams
Bissias, G. D., Liberatore, M., Jensen, D., & Levine, B. N. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11767831_1 · Cited by 229
Compromising electromagnetic emanations of wired and wireless keyboards
Vuagnoux, M., & Pasini, S. (2009) · Cited by 224
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
Wright, C. V., Ballard, L., Coull, S. E., Monrose, F., & Masson, G. M. (2008) · 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008) · doi:10.1109/sp.2008.21 · Cited by 212
The final nail in WEP's coffin
Bittau, A., Handley, M., & Lackey, J. (2006) · 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06) · doi:10.1109/sp.2006.40 · Cited by 165
Devices that tell on you: privacy trends in consumer ubiquitous computing
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Cited by
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Schuster, F., Costa, M., Fournet, C., Gkantsidis, C., Peinado, M., Mainar-Ruiz, G., & Russinovich, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.10 · Cited by 595
Peek-a-Boo, I Still See You: Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail
Dyer, K. P., Coull, S. E., Ristenpart, T., & Shrimpton, T. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.28 · Cited by 456
Collaborative Security: A Survey and Taxonomy
Meng, G., Liu, Y., Zhang, J., Pokluda, A., & Boutaba, R. (2015) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2785733 · Cited by 418
The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software
Georgiev, M., Iyengar, S., Jana, S., Anubhai, R., Boneh, D., & Shmatikov, V. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382204 · Cited by 413
Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks against Kernel Space ASLR
Hund, R., Willems, C., & Holz, T. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.23 · Cited by 393
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, S., Wang, R., Wang, X., & Zhang, K.
- Venue
- 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2010
- Pages
- 191-206
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2048702750
- Cited by
- 397
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 19.34
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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