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Cited by 178

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Implementing TLS with Verified Cryptographic Security

Open access
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., Strub, P.·2013·2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Abstract

TLS is possibly the most used protocol for secure communications, with a 18-year history of flaws and fixes, ranging from its protocol logic to its cryptographic design, and from the Internet standard to its diverse implementations. We develop a verified reference implementation of TLS 1.2. Our code fully supports its wire formats, ciphersuites, sessions and connections, re-handshakes and resumptions, alerts and errors, and data fragmentation, as prescribed in the RFCs; it interoperates with mainstream web browsers and servers. At the same time, our code is carefully structured to enable its modular, automated verification, from its main API down to computational assumptions on its cryptographic algorithms. Our implementation is written in F# and specified in F7. We present security specifications for its main components, such as authenticated stream encryption for the record layer and key establishment for the handshake. We describe their verification using the F7 typechecker. To this end, we equip each cryptographic primitive and construction of TLS with a new typed interface that captures its security properties, and we gradually replace concrete implementations with ideal functionalities. We finally typecheck the protocol state machine, and obtain precise security theorems for TLS, as it is implemented and deployed. We also revisit classic attacks and report a few new ones.

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Metadata

Authors
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., & Strub, P.
Venue
2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2013-05
Pages
445-459
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2070775894
Cited by
178
References
4
FWCI
15.83
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Implementing TLS with Verified Cryptographic Security. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2013.37
The paper
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., & Strub, P. (2013). Implementing TLS with Verified Cryptographic Security. 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2013.37

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.