The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Implementing TLS with Verified Cryptographic Security
Open accessAbstract
TLS is possibly the most used protocol for secure communications, with a 18-year history of flaws and fixes, ranging from its protocol logic to its cryptographic design, and from the Internet standard to its diverse implementations. We develop a verified reference implementation of TLS 1.2. Our code fully supports its wire formats, ciphersuites, sessions and connections, re-handshakes and resumptions, alerts and errors, and data fragmentation, as prescribed in the RFCs; it interoperates with mainstream web browsers and servers. At the same time, our code is carefully structured to enable its modular, automated verification, from its main API down to computational assumptions on its cryptographic algorithms. Our implementation is written in F# and specified in F7. We present security specifications for its main components, such as authenticated stream encryption for the record layer and key establishment for the handshake. We describe their verification using the F7 typechecker. To this end, we equip each cryptographic primitive and construction of TLS with a new typed interface that captures its security properties, and we gradually replace concrete implementations with ideal functionalities. We finally typecheck the protocol state machine, and obtain precise security theorems for TLS, as it is implemented and deployed. We also revisit classic attacks and report a few new ones.
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Cites
de Moura, L., & Bjørner, N. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-78800-3_24 · Cited by 6,595
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
Bellare, M., & Rogaway, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48329-2_21 · Cited by 1,752
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
Canetti, R., & Krawczyk, H. (2002) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-46035-7_22 · Cited by 746
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
He, C., Sundararajan, M., Datta, A., Derek, A., & Mitchell, J. C. (2005) · Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1102120.1102124 · Cited by 121
Cited by
Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif
Blanchet, B. (2016) · Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · doi:10.1561/3300000004 · Cited by 321
Dependent types and multi-monadic effects in F*
Swamy, N., Hriţcu, C., Keller, C., Rastogi, A., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Forest, S., Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Strub, P.-Y., Kohlweiss, M., et al. (2016) · Proceedings of the 43rd Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages · doi:10.1145/2837614.2837655 · Cited by 314
Self-citationTriple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS
Bhargavan, K., Lavaud, A. D., Fournet, C., Pironti, A., & Strub, P. Y. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.14 · Cited by 173
Self-citationSoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00008 · Cited by 143
Self-citationVERINA: Benchmarking Verifiable Code Generation
Ye, Z., Yan, Z., He, J., Kasriel, T., Yang, K., & Song, D. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.23135 · Cited by 3
“Formal verification presents a promising path to establish correctness guarantees in LLM-generated code but has traditionally been limited to safety-critical applications due to high cost [9–11].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., & Strub, P.
- Venue
- 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-05
- Pages
- 445-459
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2070775894
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 15.83
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., & Strub, P. (2013). Implementing TLS with Verified Cryptographic Security. 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2013.37
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