The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming: On the Difficulty of Preventing Code Reuse Attacks in C++ Applications
Open accessAbstract
Code reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) have become prevalent techniques to exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities in software programs. A variety of corresponding defenses has been proposed, of which some have already been successfully bypassed -- and the arms race continues. In this paper, we perform a systematic assessment of recently proposed CFI solutions and other defenses against code reuse attacks in the context of C++. We demonstrate that many of these defenses that do not consider object-oriented C++ semantics precisely can be generically bypassed in practice. Our novel attack technique, denoted as counterfeit object-oriented programming (COOP), induces malicious program behavior by only invoking chains of existing C++ virtual functions in a program through corresponding existing call sites. COOP is Turing complete in realistic attack scenarios and we show its viability by developing sophisticated, real-world exploits for Internet Explorer 10 on Windows and Fire fox 36 on Linux. Moreover, we show that even recently proposed defenses (CPS, T-VIP, vfGuard, and VTint) that specifically target C++ are vulnerable to COOP. We observe that constructing defenses resilient to COOP that do not require access to source code seems to be challenging. We believe that our investigation and results are helpful contributions to the design and implementation of future defenses against control flow hijacking attacks.
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The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
Shacham, H. (2007) · Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315313 · Cited by 1,280
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Control-flow integrity principles, implementations, and applications
Abadi, M., Budiu, M., Erlingsson, Ú., & Ligatti, J. (2009) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1609956.1609960 · Cited by 795
Szekeres, L., Payer, M., Wei, T., & Song, D. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.13 · Cited by 664
AddressSanitizer: a fast address sanity checker
Serebryany, K., Bruening, D., Potapenko, A., & Vyukov, D. (2012) · USENIX Annual Technical Conference · Cited by 624
Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack
Bletsch, T., Jiang, X., Freeh, V. W., & Liang, Z. (2011) · Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/1966913.1966919 · Cited by 553
Return-oriented programming without returns
Checkoway, S., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., Shacham, H., & Winandy, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866370 · Cited by 530
Self-citationJust-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization
Snow, K. Z., Monrose, F., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Liebchen, C., & Sadeghi, A. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.45 · Cited by 505
Self-citationPractical Control Flow Integrity and Randomization for Binary Executables
Zhang, C., Wei, T., Chen, Z., Duan, L., Szekeres, L., McCamant, S., Song, D., & Zou, W. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.44 · Cited by 482
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The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems
McLaughlin, S., Konstantinou, C., Wang, X., Davi, L., Sadeghi, A.-R., Maniatakos, M., & Karri, R. (2016) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2015.2512235 · Cited by 391
Self-citationC-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software
Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978358 · Cited by 258
Self-citationControl-Flow Integrity: Precision, Security, and Performance
Burow, N., Carr, S. A., Nash, J., Larsen, P., Franz, M., Brunthaler, S., & Payer, M. (2018) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3054924 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Schuster, F., Tendyck, T., Liebchen, C., Davi, L., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Holz, T.
- Venue
- 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2015-05
- Pages
- 745-762
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1538332098
- Cited by
- 353
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 27.46
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Schuster, F., Tendyck, T., Liebchen, C., Davi, L., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Holz, T. (2015). Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming: On the Difficulty of Preventing Code Reuse Attacks in C++ Applications. 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2015.51
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