C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Remote attestation is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to learn the state of a remote, and potentially malware-infected, device (prover). Most existing approaches are static in nature and only check whether benign software is initially loaded on the prover. However, they are vulnerable to runtime attacks that hijack the application's control or data flow, e.g., via return-oriented programming or data-oriented exploits. As a concrete step towards more comprehensive runtime remote attestation, we present the design and implementation of Control-FLow ATtestation (C-FLAT) that enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code. We describe a full prototype implementation of C-FLAT on Raspberry Pi using its ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions. We evaluate C-FLAT's performance using a real-world embedded (cyber-physical) application, and demonstrate its efficacy against control-flow hijacking attacks.
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“The second one was presented by Abera et al. who managed to devise a Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (C-FLAT) to verify remotely the CFI on a given embedded device in [246].”
From Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations (2022) · cites this paper as [246]
Citations
Cites
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“Keywords remote attestation; control-flow attacks; embedded system security”
BackgroundInfluentialControl-flow integrity principles, implementations, and applications
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“, SWATT [38], Pioneer [37], and VIPER [28]) can be used – under some strict assumptions – for static attestation of certain legacy devices, such as peripherals.”
BackgroundInfluentialSzekeres, L., Payer, M., Wei, T., & Song, D. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.13 · Cited by 664 · cited 1×
“Keywords remote attestation; control-flow attacks; embedded system security”
BackgroundNon-control-data attacks are realistic threats
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“, [30, 29]) are pervasive in PCs, they are not well-suited for low-end embedded devices due to their relatively high cost.”
BackgroundJump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack
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“Another variant of return-oriented programming are jump-oriented programming attacks [10, 7].”
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Background
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Cited by
Iqbal, W., Abbas, H., Daneshmand, M., Rauf, B., & Bangash, Y. A. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2997651 · Cited by 356
“C-FLAT [91] and LO-FAT [92] offered accurate attestation by manipulating attesting run time for the execution path of a program in IoT embedded end nodes.”
MethodRobotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P. A., Noura, H. N., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2022) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-021-00545-8 · Cited by 320
“who managed to devise a Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (C-FLAT) to verify remotely the CFI on a given embedded device in [246].”
Hasan, M. K., Ghazal, T. M., Saeed, R. A., Pandey, B., Gohel, H., Eshmawi, A. A., Abdel‐Khalek, S., & Alkhassawneh, H. M. (2022) · IET Communications · doi:10.1049/cmu2.12301 · Cited by 223
Yaqoob, T., Abbas, H., & Atiquzzaman, M. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2914094 · Cited by 236
“, oscilloscope, radio frequency electromagnetic waves, and some open-source tools as they can send false signals [129] and [161].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLO-FAT: Low-Overhead Control Flow ATtestation in Hardware
Dessouky, G., Zeitouni, S., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Davi, L., Koeberl, P., Asokan, N., & Sadeghi, A.-R. (2017) · Proceedings of the 54th Annual Design Automation Conference 2017 · doi:10.1145/3061639.3062276 · Cited by 101
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G.
- Affiliations
- Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
- Aalto University (FI)
- Trustonic, Helsinki, Finland
- University of California, Irvine (US)
- ORCID
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-10-24
- Pages
- 743-754
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2752493903
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 3
- FWCI
- 12.57
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (CRC1119)
- Suomen Akatemia (283135)
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (14089-503866-DS)
- Seventh Framework Programme (643964)
- National Security Agency (H98230-15-1-0276)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Keywords
- remote attestation, control-flow integrity, return-oriented programming, Internet of Things security, embedded devices, ARM TrustZone, control flow hijacking, Raspberry Pi
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2976749.2978358
- The paper
- Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G. (2016). C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978358
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