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C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software

Abera, Tigist, Asokan, N., Davi, Lucas, Ekberg, Jan-Erik, Nyman, Thomas, Paverd, Andrew, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza, Tsudik, Gene · 2016 · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Remote attestation is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to learn the state of a remote, and potentially malware-infected, device (prover). Most existing approaches are static in nature and only check whether benign software is initially loaded on the prover. However, they are vulnerable to runtime attacks that hijack the application's control or data flow, e.g., via return-oriented programming or data-oriented exploits. As a concrete step towards more comprehensive runtime remote attestation, we present the design and implementation of Control-FLow ATtestation (C-FLAT) that enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code. We describe a full prototype implementation of C-FLAT on Raspberry Pi using its ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions. We evaluate C-FLAT's performance using a real-world embedded (cyber-physical) application, and demonstrate its efficacy against control-flow hijacking attacks.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1145/2976749.2978358

Cites

38 of 38 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. ARM Limited . ARM Security Technology - Building a Secure System using TrustZone Technology , 2009 . ARM Limited. ARM Security Technology - Building a Secure System using TrustZone Technology, 2009.
  2. ARM Ltd . Procedure call standard for the ARM architecture , 2009 . ARM Ltd. Procedure call standard for the ARM architecture, 2009.
  3. H. Hu , S. Shinde , S. Adrian , Z. L. Chua , P. Saxena , and Z. Liang . Data-oriented programming: On the effectiveness of non-control data attacks . In IEEE S &P, 2016 . H. Hu, S. Shinde, S. Adrian, Z. L. Chua, P. Saxena, and Z. Liang. Data-oriented programming: On the effectiveness of non-control data attacks. In IEEE S&P, 2016.
  4. T. Kornau . Return oriented programming for the ARM architecture. Master's thesis , Ruhr-University Bochum , 2009 . T. Kornau. Return oriented programming for the ARM architecture. Master's thesis, Ruhr-University Bochum, 2009.
  5. Microsoft. Data execution prevention (DEP) , 2006 . Microsoft. Data execution prevention (DEP), 2006.
  6. Solar Designer . lpr LIBC RETURN exploit , 1997 . Solar Designer. lpr LIBC RETURN exploit, 1997.
  7. C. Tice , T. Roeder , P. Collingbourne , S. Checkoway , Ú. Erlingsson, L. Lozano , and G. Pike . Enforcing forward-edge control-flow integrity in GCC & LLVM . In USENIX Security , 2014 . C. Tice, T. Roeder, P. Collingbourne, S. Checkoway, Ú. Erlingsson, L. Lozano, and G. Pike. Enforcing forward-edge control-flow integrity in GCC & LLVM. In USENIX Security, 2014.

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Metadata

Authors
Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G.
Affiliations
  • Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
  • Aalto University (FI)
  • Trustonic, Helsinki, Finland
  • University of California, Irvine (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2016-10-24
Pages
743-754
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2752493903
Cited by
258
References
41
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 3
FWCI
12.57
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (CRC1119)
  • Suomen Akatemia (283135)
  • U.S. Department of Homeland Security (14089-503866-DS)
  • Seventh Framework Programme (643964)
  • National Security Agency (H98230-15-1-0276)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
Keywords
remote attestation, control-flow integrity, return-oriented programming, Internet of Things security, embedded devices, ARM TrustZone, control flow hijacking, Raspberry Pi

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2976749.2978358
The paper
Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G. (2016). C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978358

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.