Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Cited by 205

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate

Open access
Bhargavan, Karthikeyan, Blanchet, Bruno, Kobeissi, Nadim · 2017 · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

TLS 1.3 is the next version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Its clean-slate design is a reaction both to the increasing demand for low-latency HTTPS connections and to a series of recent high-profile attacks on TLS. The hope is that a fresh protocol with modern cryptography will prevent legacy problems, the danger is that it will expose new kinds of attacks, or reintroduce old flaws that were fixed in previous versions of TLS. After 18 drafts, the protocol is nearing completion, and the working group has appealed to researchers to analyze the protocol before publication. This paper responds by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the TLS 1.3 Draft-18 protocol. We seek to answer three questions that have not been fully addressed in previous work on TLS 1.3: (1) Does TLS 1.3 prevent well-known attacks on TLS 1.2, such as Logjam or the Triple Handshake, even if it is run in parallel with TLS 1.2? (2) Can we mechanically verify the computational security of TLS 1.3 under standard (strong) assumptions on its cryptographic primitives? (3) How can we extend the guarantees of the TLS 1.3 protocol to the details of its implementations? To answer these questions, we propose a methodology for developing verified symbolic and computational models of TLS 1.3 hand-in-hand with a high-assurance reference implementation of the protocol. We present symbolic ProVerif models for various intermediate versions of TLS 1.3 and evaluate them against a rich class of attacks to reconstruct both known and previously unpublished vulnerabilities that influenced the current design of the protocol. We present a computational CryptoVerif model for TLS 1.3 Draft-18 and prove its security. We present RefTLS, an interoperable implementation of TLS 1.0-1.3 and automatically analyze its protocol core by extracting a ProVerif model from its typed JavaScript code.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/sp.2017.26

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 205

Metadata

Authors
Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., & Kobeissi, N.
Venue
2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2017-05
Pages
483-502
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2618267215
Cited by
205
References
0
FWCI
14.25
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2017.26
The paper
Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., & Kobeissi, N. (2017). Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2017.26

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.