The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate
Open accessAbstract
TLS 1.3 is the next version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Its clean-slate design is a reaction both to the increasing demand for low-latency HTTPS connections and to a series of recent high-profile attacks on TLS. The hope is that a fresh protocol with modern cryptography will prevent legacy problems, the danger is that it will expose new kinds of attacks, or reintroduce old flaws that were fixed in previous versions of TLS. After 18 drafts, the protocol is nearing completion, and the working group has appealed to researchers to analyze the protocol before publication. This paper responds by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the TLS 1.3 Draft-18 protocol. We seek to answer three questions that have not been fully addressed in previous work on TLS 1.3: (1) Does TLS 1.3 prevent well-known attacks on TLS 1.2, such as Logjam or the Triple Handshake, even if it is run in parallel with TLS 1.2? (2) Can we mechanically verify the computational security of TLS 1.3 under standard (strong) assumptions on its cryptographic primitives? (3) How can we extend the guarantees of the TLS 1.3 protocol to the details of its implementations? To answer these questions, we propose a methodology for developing verified symbolic and computational models of TLS 1.3 hand-in-hand with a high-assurance reference implementation of the protocol. We present symbolic ProVerif models for various intermediate versions of TLS 1.3 and evaluate them against a rich class of attacks to reconstruct both known and previously unpublished vulnerabilities that influenced the current design of the protocol. We present a computational CryptoVerif model for TLS 1.3 Draft-18 and prove its security. We present RefTLS, an interoperable implementation of TLS 1.0-1.3 and automatically analyze its protocol core by extracting a ProVerif model from its typed JavaScript code.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Edge Computing Security: State of the Art and Challenges
Xiao, Y., Jia, Y., Liu, C., Cheng, X., Yu, J., & Lv, W. (2019) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2918437 · Cited by 534
A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication
Basin, D., Dreier, J., Hirschi, L., Radomirovic, S., Sasse, R., & Stettler, V. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243846 · Cited by 412
Automatic Software Repair: A Survey
Gazzola, L., Micucci, D., & Mariani, L. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2017.2755013 · Cited by 327
SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00008 · Cited by 143
Self-citationVision: A Critique of Immunity Passports and W3C Decentralized Identifiers
Halpin, H. (2020) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64357-7_7 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., & Kobeissi, N.
- Venue
- 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-05
- Pages
- 483-502
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2618267215
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 14.25
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2017.26
- The paper
- Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., & Kobeissi, N. (2017). Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2017.26
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.