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A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication

Open access
Basin, David, Dreier, Jannik, Hirschi, Lucca, Radomirovic, Saša, Sasse, Ralf, Stettler, Vincent·2018·Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found.

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Metadata

Authors
Basin, D., Dreier, J., Hirschi, L., Radomirovic, S., Sasse, R., & Stettler, V.
Venue
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2018-10-15
Pages
1383-1396
OpenAlex
W2809727329
Cited by
412
References
0
FWCI
33.21
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3243734.3243846
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Basin, D., Dreier, J., Hirschi, L., Radomirovic, S., Sasse, R., & Stettler, V. (2018). A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication. Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243846

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