Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 308

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

FPGA-Based Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks

Zhao, Mark, Suh, G. Edward·2018·2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

The rapid adoption of heterogeneous computing has driven the integration of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) into cloud datacenters and flexible System-on-Chips (SoCs). This paper shows that the integrated FPGA introduces a new security vulnerability by enabling software-based power side-channel attacks without physical proximity to a target system. We first demonstrate that an on-chip power monitor can be built on a modern FPGA using ring oscillators (ROs), and characterize its ability to observe the power consumption of other modules on the FPGA or the SoC. Then, we show that the RO-based FPGA power monitor can be used for a successful power analysis attack on an RSA cryptomodule on the same FPGA. Additionally, we show that the FPGA-based power monitor can observe the power consumption of a CPU on the same SoC, and demonstrate that the FPGA-to-CPU power side-channel attack can break timing-channel protection for a RSA program running on a CPU. This work introduces and demonstrates remote power side-channel attacks using an FPGA, showing that the common assumption that power side-channel attacks require specialized equipment and physical access to the victim hardware is not true for systems with an integrated FPGA.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/sp.2018.00049

Cites

24 of 24 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 24 references

Cited by

See all 308

Metadata

Authors
Zhao, M., & Suh, G. E.
Venue
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2018-05
Pages
229-244
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2794898833
Cited by
308
References
24
FWCI
13.00
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: FPGA-Based Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2018.00049
The paper
Zhao, M., & Suh, G. E. (2018). FPGA-Based Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks. 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.00049

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.