The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
T-Fuzz: Fuzzing by Program Transformation
Abstract
Fuzzing is a simple yet effective approach to discover software bugs utilizing randomly generated inputs. However, it is limited by coverage and cannot find bugs hidden in deep execution paths of the program because the randomly generated inputs fail complex sanity checks, e.g., checks on magic values, checksums, or hashes. To improve coverage, existing approaches rely on imprecise heuristics or complex input mutation techniques (e.g., symbolic execution or taint analysis) to bypass sanity checks. Our novel method tackles coverage from a different angle: by removing sanity checks in the target program. T-Fuzz leverages a coverage-guided fuzzer to generate inputs. Whenever the fuzzer can no longer trigger new code paths, a light-weight, dynamic tracing based technique detects the input checks that the fuzzer-generated inputs fail. These checks are then removed from the target program. Fuzzing then continues on the transformed program, allowing the code protected by the removed checks to be triggered and potential bugs discovered. Fuzzing transformed programs to find bugs poses two challenges: (1) removal of checks leads to over-approximation and false positives, and (2) even for true bugs, the crashing input on the transformed program may not trigger the bug in the original program. As an auxiliary post-processing step, T-Fuzz leverages a symbolic execution-based approach to filter out false positives and reproduce true bugs in the original program. By transforming the program as well as mutating the input, T-Fuzz covers more code and finds more true bugs than any existing technique. We have evaluated T-Fuzz on the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge dataset, LAVA-M dataset and 4 real-world programs (pngfix, tiffinfo, magick and pdftohtml). For the CGC dataset, T-Fuzz finds bugs in 166 binaries, Driller in 121, and AFL in 105. In addition, found 3 new bugs in previously-fuzzed programs and libraries.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Klees, G., Ruef, A., Cooper, B., Wei, S., & Hicks, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243804 · Cited by 633
(2021) · doi:10.1109/tse.2019.2946563 · Cited by 574
Learning to Fuzz from Symbolic Execution with Application to Smart Contracts
He, J., Balunović, M., Ambroladze, N., Tsankov, P., & Vechev, M. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363230 · Cited by 269
Hawkeye: Towards a Desired Directed Grey-box Fuzzer
Chen, H., Xue, Y., Li, Y., Chen, B., Xie, X., Wu, X., & Liu, Y. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243849 · Cited by 263
DocTer: documentation-guided fuzzing for testing deep learning API functions
Xie, D., Li, Y., Kim, M., Pham, H. V., Tan, L., Zhang, X., & Godfrey, M. W. (2022) · Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis · doi:10.1145/3533767.3534220 · Cited by 81
“Fuzzers [3, 5, 9] have been adopted to test non-DL libraries [29, 41].”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Peng, H., Shoshitaishvili, Y., & Payer, M.
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-05
- Pages
- 697-710
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2795192879
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 28.27
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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