Cited by 208Software Engineering ResearchInformation and Cyber SecurityWeb Application Security Vulnerabilities

SoK: Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains

Open access
Ladisa, Piergiorgio, Plate, Henrik, Martinez, Matias, Barais, Olivier·2023·2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

The widespread dependency on open-source software makes it a fruitful target for malicious actors, as demonstrated by recurring attacks. The complexity of today’s open-source supply chains results in a significant attack surface, giving attackers numerous opportunities to reach the goal of injecting malicious code into open-source artifacts that is then downloaded and executed by victims.This work proposes a general taxonomy for attacks on open-source supply chains, independent of specific programming languages or ecosystems, and covering all supply chain stages from code contributions to package distribution. Taking the form of an attack tree, it covers 107 unique vectors, linked to 94 real-world incidents, and mapped to 33 mitigating safeguards.User surveys conducted with 17 domain experts and 134 software developers positively validated the correctness, comprehensiveness and comprehensibility of the taxonomy, as well as its suitability for various use-cases. Survey participants also assessed the utility and costs of the identified safeguards, and whether they are used.

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Crossref · 10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179304

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  • PQC transition affects TLS, certificate chains, and secure enclaves due to increased key sizes, larger signature sizes, and hybrid mode requirements during the transition period.

    “PQC transition affects all three due to increased key sizes, larger signature sizes, and hybrid mode requirements during the transition period [17,18].”

    From AI Supply Chain Security: MBOM-PQC Provenance, PQC Attestation, and a Maturity Model for Quantum-Resistant Assurance (2026) · cites this paper as [17]

    The paper’s List of Safeguards discusses code signing and signature verification for open-source software supply chains, but not the effects of a post-quantum cryptography transition. Searches for PQC, TLS, certificate chains, secure enclaves, key and signature sizes, and hybrid modes found no passage addressing the attributed claim. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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  • IETF drafts for hybrid key exchange [17,18], PQC certificate profiles, and composite signature formats are still in progress.

    “IETF drafts for hybrid key exchange [17,18], PQC certificate profiles, and composite signature formats are still in progress.”

    From AI Supply Chain Security: MBOM-PQC Provenance, PQC Attestation, and a Maturity Model for Quantum-Resistant Assurance (2026) · cites this paper as [17]

    The safeguards table (Additional information, page unavailable) mentions code signing, but not IETF drafts or the status of hybrid key exchange, PQC certificate profiles, or composite signature formats. Searches for those terms and for post-quantum standards found no passage in our copy addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.76)

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Research works printed but not linked: 15

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Authors
Ladisa, P., Plate, H., Martinez, M., & Barais, O.
Affiliations
  • Systems, Applications & Products in Data Processing (Switzerland) (CH)
  • Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France
  • Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique (FR)
Venue
2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2023-05
Pages
1509-1526
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4385208592
Cited by
208
References
94
Citations by year
2026: 65 · 2025: 63 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 2
FWCI
52.94
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Research
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
Keywords
attack taxonomy, supply chain attacks, malicious code injection, attack trees, software supply chain security, security measures, developer survey, attack vectors

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