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Cited by 197

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

D-WARD: A Source-End Defense against Flooding Denial-of-Service Attacks

Mirkovic, J., Reiher, P. · 2005 · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing

Abstract

Defenses against flooding distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) commonly respond to the attack by dropping the excess traffic, thus reducing the overload at the victim. The major challenge is the differentiation of the legitimate from the attack traffic, so that the dropping policies can be selectively applied. We propose D-WARD, a source-end DDoS defense system that achieves autonomous attack detection and surgically accurate response, thanks to its novel traffic profiling techniques, the adaptive response and the source-end deployment. Moderate traffic volumes seen near the sources, even during the attacks, enable extensive statistics gathering and profiling, facilitating high response selectiveness. D-WARD inflicts an extremely low collateral damage to the legitimate traffic, while quickly detecting and severely rate-limiting outgoing attacks. D-WARD has been extensively evaluated in a controlled testbed environment and in real network operation. Results of selected tests are presented in the paper.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tdsc.2005.35

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Cites

  • Distributed denial of service attacks

    Lau, F., Rubin, S. H., Smith, M. H., & Trajkovic, L. (2002) · SMC 2000 Conference Proceedings. 2000 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. 'Cybernetics Evolving to Systems, Humans, Organizations, and their Complex Interactions' (Cat. No.00CH37166) · doi:10.1109/icsmc.2000.886455 · Cited by 582

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Metadata

Authors
Mirkovic, J., & Reiher, P.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Published
2005-03
Volume
2
Issue
3
Pages
216-232
ISSN
1545-5971 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2111958600
Cited by
197
References
1
FWCI
12.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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