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Physical Unclonable Function Exploiting Sneak Paths in Resistive Cross-point Array

Gao, Ligang, Chen, Pai-Yu, Liu, Rui, Yu, Shimeng · 2016 · IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices
Cited by 74

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The physical unclonable function (PUF) is a promising innovative hardware security primitive that leverages the inherent randomness in the physical systems to produce unique responses upon the inquiry of challenges, thus the PUF could serve as a fingerprint for device authentication. In this paper, we propose a novel PUF implementation exploiting the sneak paths in the resistive cross-point (X-point) array, as a hardware security primitive. The entanglement of the sneak paths in the X-point array greatly enhances the entropy of the physical system, thereby increasing the space of challenge-response pairs to make a strong PUF. The X-point PUF characteristics, such as uniqueness and reliability, are experimentally evaluated on the fabricated 12 × 12 cross-point arrays based on the Pt/HfOx/TiN structure. The measurement results show that the average inter-Hamming distance of the response bits is around 46.2% across 28 different arrays, showing sufficient uniqueness. The measurement results also demonstrate that 0% intra-Hamming distance (or 100% reliability) of the response bits can be maintained more than 7.2 h at 100 °C (or equivalently ten years at 40 °C). This paper demonstrates the feasibility of using X-point PUF as a lightweight and reliable PUF for device authentication.

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Crossref · 10.1109/ted.2016.2578720

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Metadata

Authors
Gao, L., Chen, P.-Y., Liu, R., & Yu, S.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices
Published
2016-08
Volume
63
Issue
8
Pages
3109-3115
ISSN
  • 0018-9383 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-9646
OpenAlex
W2472981853
Cited by
74
References
8
FWCI
9.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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