Physical Unclonable Function Exploiting Sneak Paths in Resistive Cross-point Array
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The physical unclonable function (PUF) is a promising innovative hardware security primitive that leverages the inherent randomness in the physical systems to produce unique responses upon the inquiry of challenges, thus the PUF could serve as a fingerprint for device authentication. In this paper, we propose a novel PUF implementation exploiting the sneak paths in the resistive cross-point (X-point) array, as a hardware security primitive. The entanglement of the sneak paths in the X-point array greatly enhances the entropy of the physical system, thereby increasing the space of challenge-response pairs to make a strong PUF. The X-point PUF characteristics, such as uniqueness and reliability, are experimentally evaluated on the fabricated 12 × 12 cross-point arrays based on the Pt/HfOx/TiN structure. The measurement results show that the average inter-Hamming distance of the response bits is around 46.2% across 28 different arrays, showing sufficient uniqueness. The measurement results also demonstrate that 0% intra-Hamming distance (or 100% reliability) of the response bits can be maintained more than 7.2 h at 100 °C (or equivalently ten years at 40 °C). This paper demonstrates the feasibility of using X-point PUF as a lightweight and reliable PUF for device authentication.
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Citations
Cites
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“RRAM is an emerging NVM candidate that leverages the resistive switching phenomenon in insulators [16]–[18].”
BackgroundAtomic structure of conducting nanofilaments in TiO2 resistive switching memory
Kwon, D.-H., Kim, K. M., Jang, J. H., Jeon, J. M., Lee, M. H., Kim, G. H., Li, X.-S., Park, G.-S., Lee, B., Han, S., et al. (2010) · Nature Nanotechnology · doi:10.1038/nnano.2009.456 · Cited by 2,092 · cited 1×
“The physical mechanism of RRAM relies on formation and rupture of conductive filament that consists of defects in the oxide layer between two metal electrodes [19]–[21].”
BackgroundPUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data
Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J., Sehnke, F., Xu, X., Mahmoud, A., Stoyanova, V., Dror, G., Schmidhuber, J., Burleson, W., & Devadas, S. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2013.2279798 · Cited by 637 · cited 1×
“Arbiter PUF, SRAM PUF, and so on) are not scalable and cannot be completely immune to different types of attacks [5], [6].”
BackgroundGuan, X., Yu, S., & Wong, H.-S. P. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices · doi:10.1109/ted.2012.2184545 · Cited by 355 · cited 1×
“Due to the randomness of the defect generation and annihilation in oxide, the shape of the conductive filament varies from device to device, and even from cycle to cycle within one device [23].”
BackgroundSelf-citationCrossbar RRAM Arrays: Selector Device Requirements During Read Operation
Zhou, J., Kim, K.-H., & Lu, W. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices · doi:10.1109/ted.2014.2310200 · Cited by 310 · cited 1×
“For memory applications, such sneak paths are detrimental to the read-out sense margin [26], [27], while here we take an advantage of sneak paths.”
BackgroundCrossbar RRAM Arrays: Selector Device Requirements During Write Operation
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Celano, U., Goux, L., Degraeve, R., Fantini, A., Richard, O., Bender, H., Jurczak, M., & Vandervorst, W. (2015) · Nano Letters · doi:10.1021/acs.nanolett.5b03078 · Cited by 186
Cited by
Memory devices and applications for in-memory computing
Sebastian, A., Le Gallo, M., Khaddam-Aljameh, R., & Eleftheriou, E. (2020) · Nature Nanotechnology · doi:10.1038/s41565-020-0655-z · Cited by 2,289
In-memory computing with resistive switching devices
Ielmini, D., & Wong, H.-S. P. (2018) · Nature Electronics · doi:10.1038/s41928-018-0092-2 · Cited by 2,298
“The same concept can be generalized by biasing an arbitrary number of columns, serving as the input challenge 94 .”
BackgroundResistive switching materials for information processing
Wang, Z., Wu, H., Burr, G. W., Hwang, C. S., Wang, K. L., Xia, Q., & Yang, J. J. (2020) · Nature Reviews Materials · doi:10.1038/s41578-019-0159-3 · Cited by 1,214
Amirsoleimani, A., Alibart, F., Yon, V., Xu, J., Pazhouhandeh, M. R., Ecoffey, S., Beilliard, Y., Genov, R., & Drouin, D. (2020) · Advanced Intelligent Systems · doi:10.1002/aisy.202000115 · Cited by 216
Metadata
- Authors
- Gao, L., Chen, P.-Y., Liu, R., & Yu, S.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices
- Published
- 2016-08
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 3109-3115
- ISSN
- 0018-9383 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-9646
- OpenAlex
- W2472981853
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 9.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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