The $N$ -Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from evolutionary game theorists. In this letter, an N-player trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and the individuals in the long run, evolutionary dynamics show this ideal situation is reached only in a special case when the initial population contains no untrustworthy individuals. When the initial population consists of even the slightest number of untrustworthy individuals, the society converges to zero trusters, with many untrustworthy individuals. The promotion of trust is an uneasy task, despite the fact that a combination of trusters and trustworthy trustees is the most rational and optimal social state. This letter presents the game and results of replicator dynamics in a hope that researchers in evolutionary games see opportunities in filling this critical gap in the literature.
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Cites
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Cited by
An Energy Efficient Ant Colony System for Virtual Machine Placement in Cloud Computing
Liu, X.-F., Zhan, Z.-H., Deng, J. D., Li, Y., Gu, T., & Zhang, J. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2016.2623803 · Cited by 407
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The evolution of trust and trustworthiness
Kumar, A., Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0491 · Cited by 148
A Networked ${N}$ -Player Trust Game and Its Evolutionary Dynamics
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“However, Abbass et al. [9] did not considered the evolution of trust in a structured population.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialConditional investment strategy in evolutionary trust games with repeated group interactions
Liu, L., & Chen, X. (2022) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2022.07.073 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Abbass, H., Greenwood, G., & Petraki, E.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 470-474
- ISSN
- 1089-778X (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0026
- OpenAlex
- W2283950796
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 9.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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