Reconstruction Attacks Against Mobile-Based Continuous Authentication Systems in the Cloud
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Continuous authentication for mobile devices using behavioral biometrics is being suggested to complement initial authentication for securing mobile devices, and the cloud services accessed through them. This area has been studied over the past few years, and low error rates were achieved; however, it was based on training and testing using support vector machine (SVM) and other non-privacy-preserving machine learning algorithms. To stress the importance of carefully designed privacy-preserving systems, we investigate the possibility of reconstructing gestures raw data from users' authentication profiles or synthesized samples' testing results. We propose two types of reconstruction attacks based on whether actual user samples are available to the adversary (as in SVM profiles) or not. We also propose two algorithms to reconstruct raw data: a numerical-based algorithm that is specific to one compromised system, and a randomization-based algorithm that can work against almost any compromised system. For our experiments, we selected one compromised and four attacked gesture-based continuous authentication systems from the recent literature. The experiments, performed using a public data set, showed that the attacks were feasible, with a median ranging from 80% to 100% against one attacked system using all types of attacks and algorithms, and a median ranging from 73% to 100% against all attacked systems using the randomization-based algorithm and the negative support vector attack. Finally, we analyze the results, and provide recommendations for building active authentication systems that could resist reconstruction attacks.
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Citations
Cites
Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures
Fredrikson, M., Jha, S., & Ristenpart, T. (2015) · Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2810103.2813677 · Cited by 2,961
Frank, M., Biedert, R., Ma, E., Martinovic, I., & Song, D. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2012.2225048 · Cited by 844 · cited 10×
“received the most attention in the recent literature ([4]–[7],”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluential
Cited by
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning: Threats and Solutions
Al-Rubaie, M., & Chang, J. M. (2019) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msec.2018.2888775 · Cited by 444
Self-citationPersonalized Federated Learning With Differential Privacy
Hu, R., Guo, Y., Li, H., Pei, Q., & Gong, Y. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2991416 · Cited by 350
Yang, Q., Liu, Y., Cheng, Y., Kang, Y., Chen, T., & Yu, H. (2019) · Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning · doi:10.2200/s00960ed2v01y201910aim043 · Cited by 261
When Machine Learning Meets Privacy in 6G: A Survey
Sun, Y., Liu, J., Wang, J., Cao, Y., & Kato, N. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.3011561 · Cited by 211
“Al-Rubaie and Chang explore the possibility of reconstructing gesture raw data from test results of a user’s authentication profile or synthetic samples [48].”
BackgroundSecurity, Privacy, and Usability in Continuous Authentication: A Survey
Baig, A. F., & Eskeland, S. (2021) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s21175967 · Cited by 98
“Compromised profiles based on behavioral biometrics may reveal user identities and behavior that cannot be permanently changed like a password [113].”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Al-Rubaie, M., & Chang, J. M.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 2648-2663
- ISSN
- 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-6021
- OpenAlex
- W2501277411
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 5.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Al-Rubaie, M., & Chang, J. M. (2016). Reconstruction Attacks Against Mobile-Based Continuous Authentication Systems in the Cloud. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2016.2594132
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