Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 188

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Cloud-Based Approximate Constrained Shortest Distance Queries Over Encrypted Graphs With Privacy Protection

Shen, Meng, Ma, Baoli, Zhu, Liehuang, Mijumbi, Rashid, Du, Xiaojiang, Hu, Jiankun·2018·IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Abstract

Constrained shortest distance (CSD) querying is one of the fundamental graph query primitives, which finds the shortest distance from an origin to a destination in a graph with a constraint that the total cost does not exceed a given threshold. CSD querying has a wide range of applications, such as routing in telecommunications and transportation. With an increasing prevalence of cloud computing paradigm, graph owners desire to outsource their graphs to cloud servers. In order to protect sensitive information, these graphs are usually encrypted before being outsourced to the cloud. This, however, imposes a great challenge to CSD querying over encrypted graphs. Since performing constraint filtering is an intractable task, existing work mainly focuses on unconstrained shortest distance queries. CSD querying over encrypted graphs remains an open research problem. In this paper, we propose Connor, a novel graph encryption scheme that enables approximate CSD querying. Connor is built based on an efficient, tree-based ciphertext comparison protocol, and makes use of symmetric-key primitives and the somewhat homomorphic encryption, making it computationally efficient. Using Connor, a graph owner can first encrypt privacy-sensitive graphs and then outsource them to the cloud server, achieving the necessary privacy without losing the ability of querying. Extensive experiments with real-world data sets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed graph encryption scheme.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/tifs.2017.2774451

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Cited by

See all 188

Metadata

Authors
Shen, M., Ma, B., Zhu, L., Mijumbi, R., Du, X., & Hu, J.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2018-04
Volume
13
Issue
4
Pages
940-953
ISSN
  • 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-6021
OpenAlex
W2770638201
Cited by
188
References
1
FWCI
15.58
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cloud-Based Approximate Constrained Shortest Distance Queries Over Encrypted Graphs With Privacy Protection. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tifs.2017.2774451
The paper
Shen, M., Ma, B., Zhu, L., Mijumbi, R., Du, X., & Hu, J. (2018). Cloud-Based Approximate Constrained Shortest Distance Queries Over Encrypted Graphs With Privacy Protection. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2017.2774451

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.