Cited by 185Smart Grid Security and ResiliencePower Systems and TechnologiesSmart Grid and Power Systems

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A Review of IEC 62351 Security Mechanisms for IEC 61850 Message Exchanges

Open access
Hussain, S. M. Suhail, Ustun, Taha Selim, Kalam, Akhtar·2020·IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics

Abstract

Smart grid is the nexus of advanced information and communication technologies and legacy power systems. With increasing awareness on the vulnerabilities of smart grids to cyberattacks, cybersecurity is becoming a prime concern. Earlier, it was assumed that the power system communication protocols are very specialized and different, so the “security by obscurity” approach would be sufficient. However, with the standardization of communication protocols for power utilities and the emergence of the power market, this approach is no longer valid. IEC 62351 Standard has been published to provide security recommendations for different power system communication protocols including IEC 61850. IEC 61850 is emerging as the most promising and popular power system communication standard. Therefore, in this article, a detailed analysis of security threats, possible attacks, and security requirements for IEC 61850 communication is presented. Building on this, the security considerations presented in IEC 62351 for securing different IEC 61850 messages, such as generic object-oriented substation events (GOOSE), sampled values (SV), routable-GOOSE, routable-SV, and manufacturing message specification messages have been presented in great detail.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tii.2019.2956734

Cites

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  • IEC 61850 has become the de facto or preferred communication standard for substation automation in the smart grid.

    “IEC 61850 [9,10,11,12,13,14] has become the de facto standard for substation communication within the smart grid.”

    From Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid (2021) · cites this paper as [4]

    The Abstract (page unavailable) calls IEC 61850 the most promising smart-grid communication standard and says it was initially proposed for substation automation. Section A, “IEC 61850 for power utility automation beyond SAS” (page unavailable), describes its popularity, but says it is poised to become the preferred standard. The copy therefore supports its prominence, not the stronger claim that it has already become the de facto standard. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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  • The IEC 62351 standard was developed to overcome the limitation of insecure IEC 61850-based communication and provide cybersecurity objectives across other communication protocols.

    “To overcome this limitation and provide cybersecurity objectives even across the other communication protocols, the IEC 62351 [4,16] standard was developed.”

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Citations

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2 of the 74 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. 2018, IEC 61850 edition 2—The standard evolves and so does the industry
  2. hohlbaum, 2010, Cyber security practical considerations for implementing IEC 62351, Proc PAC World Conf

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Metadata

Authors
Hussain, S. M. S., Ustun, T. S., & Kalam, A.
Affiliations
  • Fukushima Renewable Energy Institute, AIST (JP)
  • Victoria University (AU)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Published
2020-09
Volume
16
Issue
9
Pages
5643-5654
ISSN
  • 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0050
OpenAlex
W2991063899
Cited by
185
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 25 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 9
FWCI
8.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
  • Victoria University Research Repository (Victoria University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Fukushima Prefecture's Reconstruction (2019)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
Keywords
IEC 62351, IEC 61850, smart grid cybersecurity, power system communication security, security threats, cyberattacks, security requirements, geese, sampled values, Manufacturing Message Specification

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