Footprint: Detecting Sybil Attacks in Urban Vehicular Networks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In urban vehicular networks, where privacy, especially the location privacy of anonymous vehicles is highly concerned, anonymous verification of vehicles is indispensable. Consequently, an attacker who succeeds in forging multiple hostile identifies can easily launch a Sybil attack, gaining a disproportionately large influence. In this paper, we propose a novel Sybil attack detection mechanism, Footprint, using the trajectories of vehicles for identification while still preserving their location privacy. More specifically, when a vehicle approaches a road-side unit (RSU), it actively demands an authorized message from the RSU as the proof of the appearance time at this RSU. We design a location-hidden authorized message generation scheme for two objectives: first, RSU signatures on messages are signer ambiguous so that the RSU location information is concealed from the resulted authorized message; second, two authorized messages signed by the same RSU within the same given period of time (temporarily linkable) are recognizable so that they can be used for identification. With the temporal limitation on the linkability of two authorized messages, authorized messages used for long-term identification are prohibited. With this scheme, vehicles can generate a location-hidden trajectory for location-privacy-preserved identification by collecting a consecutive series of authorized messages. Utilizing social relationship among trajectories according to the similarity definition of two trajectories, Footprint can recognize and therefore dismiss “communities” of Sybil trajectories. Rigorous security analysis and extensive trace-driven simulations demonstrate the efficacy of Footprint.
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Cites
Douceur, J. R. (2002) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24 · Cited by 4,419 · cited 3×
“While it was first described and formalized by Douceur [3], the Sybil attack has been a severe and pervasive problem in many forms.”
Cited by
Smart Cities: A Survey on Data Management, Security, and Enabling Technologies
Gharaibeh, A., Salahuddin, M. A., Hussini, S. J., Khreishah, A., Khalil, I., Guizani, M., & Al-Fuqaha, A. (2017) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2017.2736886 · Cited by 628
A survey of attacks and detection mechanisms on intelligent transportation systems: VANETs and IoV
Sakiz, F., & Sen, S. (2017) · Ad Hoc Networks · doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2017.03.006 · Cited by 421
Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication Platforms
Hasan, M., Mohan, S., Shimizu, T., & Lu, H. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles · doi:10.1109/tiv.2020.2987430 · Cited by 275
Survey on Misbehavior Detection in Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems
van der Heijden, R. W., Dietzel, S., Leinmuller, T., & Kargl, F. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2873088 · Cited by 258
Multi-channel based Sybil attack detection in vehicular ad hoc networks using RSSI
Yao, Y., Xiao, B., Wu, G., Liu, X., Yu, Z., Zhang, K., & Zhou, X. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/tmc.2018.2833849 · Cited by 118
“proposed a scheme named Footprint to detect Sybil attack to solve above problem [9].”
MethodA hybrid framework to prevent VANET from Sybil Attack
Faisal, S. M., Kumar Gupta, B., & Zaidi, T. (2022) · 2022 5th International Conference on Multimedia, Signal Processing and Communication Technologies (IMPACT) · doi:10.1109/impact55510.2022.10029103 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Chang, S., Qi, Y., Zhu, H., Zhao, J., & Shen, X.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
- Published
- 2012-06
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1103-1114
- ISSN
- 1045-9219 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2041439392
- Cited by
- 138
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 4.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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