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Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach

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El Rahi, Georges, Etesami, S. Rasoul, Saad, Walid, Mandayam, Narayan B., Poor, H. Vincent · 2019 · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Cited by 195

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg game between the power company and multiple prosumers. In this game, the power company acts as a leader who determines the pricing strategy that maximizes its profits, while the prosumers act as followers who react by choosing the amount of energy to buy or sell so as to optimize their current and future profits. The proposed game accounts for each prosumer's subjective decision when faced with the uncertainty of profits, induced by the random future price. In particular, the framing effect, from the framework of prospect theory (PT), is used to account for each prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to an individual utility reference point. The reference point changes between prosumers and stems from their past experience and future aspirations of profits. The followers' noncooperative game is shown to admit a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) under classical game theory which is obtained using a fully distributed algorithm. The results are extended to account for the case of PT using algorithmic solutions that can achieve an NE under certain conditions. Simulation results show that the total grid load varies significantly with the prosumers' reference point and their loss-aversion level. In addition, it is shown that the power company's profits considerably decrease when it fails to account for the prosumers' subjective perceptions under PT.

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Metadata

Authors
El Rahi, G., Etesami, S. R., Saad, W., Mandayam, N. B., & Poor, H. V.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Published
2019-01
Volume
10
Issue
1
Pages
702-713
ISSN
  • 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
  • 1949-3061
OpenAlex
W2755409125
Cited by
195
References
4
FWCI
7.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Funders
National Science Foundation (ECCS-1549894, ACI-1541105, ECCS-1549881, CNS-1446621, ECCS 1549900)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tsg.2017.2750706
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El Rahi, G., Etesami, S. R., Saad, W., Mandayam, N. B., & Poor, H. V. (2019). Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2017.2750706

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