Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg game between the power company and multiple prosumers. In this game, the power company acts as a leader who determines the pricing strategy that maximizes its profits, while the prosumers act as followers who react by choosing the amount of energy to buy or sell so as to optimize their current and future profits. The proposed game accounts for each prosumer's subjective decision when faced with the uncertainty of profits, induced by the random future price. In particular, the framing effect, from the framework of prospect theory (PT), is used to account for each prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to an individual utility reference point. The reference point changes between prosumers and stems from their past experience and future aspirations of profits. The followers' noncooperative game is shown to admit a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) under classical game theory which is obtained using a fully distributed algorithm. The results are extended to account for the case of PT using algorithmic solutions that can achieve an NE under certain conditions. Simulation results show that the total grid load varies significantly with the prosumers' reference point and their loss-aversion level. In addition, it is shown that the power company's profits considerably decrease when it fails to account for the prosumers' subjective perceptions under PT.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Optimization of conditional value-at-risk
Rockafellar, R. T., & Uryasev, S. (2000) · The Journal of Risk · doi:10.21314/jor.2000.038 · Cited by 6,725
Energy Sharing Management for Microgrids With PV Prosumers: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Liu, N., Yu, X., Wang, C., & Wang, J. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2017.2654302 · Cited by 425
Research works printed but not linked: 33
- 10.2307/1911749 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1007/s10288-007-0054-4 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1023/A:1019097208499 · doi:10.1023/a:1019097208499
- 10.1109/TAC.2018.2797217 · DOI
- 10.1109/ALLERTON.2016.7852237 · DOI
- 0, National Centre of Competence in Research Financial Valuation and Risk Management Zurich 2010
- bertsekas, 2003, Convex Analysis and Optimization
- 10.1109/IJCNN.2014.6889608 · DOI
- 10.1109/TSG.2014.2376522 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1016/j.eneco.2012.12.010 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/ICASSP.2014.6855114 · DOI
- 10.1109/JPROC.2016.2520760 · DOI
- 10.1109/TSG.2015.2483522 · DOI
- 10.1109/TSG.2017.2652846 · DOI
- fink, 1964, Equilibrium in a stochastic n-person game, J Sci Hiroshima Univ A-I (Math ), 28, 89
- 10.1109/ISGT.2012.6175753 · DOI
- han, 2012, Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks Theory Models and Applications
- 10.1109/ACC.2011.5991431 · doi:10.1109/acc.2011.5991431
- hajj, 2014, A game theory approach to demand side management in smart grids, Intelligent Systems, 807
- 10.1073/pnas.39.10.1953 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/TSG.2012.2212729 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.12.039 · DOI · Paper page
- chen, 2012, Optimal demand response scheduling with Stackelberg game approach under load uncertainty for smart grid, IEEE Int Conf on Smart Grid Comm (SmartGridComm), 546
- 10.1109/TSG.2012.2206060 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/TSG.2012.2223766 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/MSP.2012.2186531 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7036897 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.artint.2012.11.004 · DOI
- 10.1109/TCCN.2015.2488636 · DOI
- 10.3141/1926-21 · DOI
- kar, 2015, A game of thrones: When human behavior models compete in repeated Stackelberg security games, Proc 1st Int Conf Autonomous Agents Multiagent Syst, 1381
- 10.1145/1791314.1791330 · DOI
- 10.1109/ISGT.2010.5434752 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Magrini, A., Lentini, G., Cuman, S., Bodrato, A., & Marenco, L. (2020) · Developments in the Built Environment · doi:10.1016/j.dibe.2020.100019 · Cited by 214
Voltage Optimization in PV-Rich Distribution Networks—A Review
Dubravac, M., Fekete, K., Topić, D., & Barukčić, M. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app122312426 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- El Rahi, G., Etesami, S. R., Saad, W., Mandayam, N. B., & Poor, H. V.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Published
- 2019-01
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 702-713
- ISSN
- 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3061
- OpenAlex
- W2755409125
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 7.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (ECCS-1549894, ACI-1541105, ECCS-1549881, CNS-1446621, ECCS 1549900)
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tsg.2017.2750706
- The paper
- El Rahi, G., Etesami, S. R., Saad, W., Mandayam, N. B., & Poor, H. V. (2019). Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2017.2750706
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.