Cited by 332Smart Grid Security and ResiliencePower System Optimization and StabilityElectricity Theft Detection Techniques

Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: A Semi-Supervised Deep Learning Approach

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Zhang, Ying, Wang, Jianhui, Chen, Bo·2021·IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid

Abstract

The dependence on advanced information and communication technology increases the vulnerability in smart grids under cyber-attacks. Recent research on unobservable false data injection attacks (FDIAs) reveals the high risk of secure system operation, since these attacks can bypass current bad data detection mechanisms. To mitigate this risk, this paper proposes a data-driven learning-based algorithm for detecting unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems. We use autoencoders for efficient dimension reduction and feature extraction of measurement datasets. Further, we integrate the autoencoders into an advanced generative adversarial network (GAN) framework, which successfully detects anomalies under FDIAs by capturing the unconformity between abnormal and secure measurements. Also, considering that the datasets collected from practical power systems are partially labeled due to expensive labeling costs and missing labels, the proposed method only requires a few labeled measurement data in addition to unlabeled data for training. Numerical simulations in three-phase unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems validate the detection accuracy and efficiency of this method.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tsg.2020.3010510

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  • The prevalence of outliers in modern distribution systems poses a challenge to obtaining reliable power flow solutions.

    “Besides, the prevalence of outliers in modern distribution systems poses another challenge to obtaining reliable PF solutions. Anomalous data, recorded by meters, might arise for a variety of reasons, due to meter malfunction, false data injection attacks, or communication interruption [12], [13].”

    From Taylor-Expansion-Based Robust Power Flow in Unbalanced Distribution Systems: A Hybrid Data-Aided Method (2024) · cites this paper as [13]

    The Introduction (page unavailable) says false data injection attacks can degrade state estimation in distribution systems, and “D. Impacts of Measurement Noises” discusses smart-meter malfunction. The paper does not establish that outliers are prevalent or that they impede reliable power-flow solutions; the passages found also do not identify communication interruption as a cause of anomalous meter data. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. 2017) IEEE test feeder specifications. [Online]. Available: http://sites.ieee.org/pes-testfeeders/resources
  2. Dec. 2011) IEEE standard for synchrophasor measurements for power systems, IEEE Standard C37.118-2005.
  3. Ying Zhang (S'18) received the M.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from Shandong University, Jinan, China, in 2017, and the Ph.D. degree in Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering from Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, USA, in 2020. Her research interests include situa- tional awareness for power system monitoring and control via optimization and machine learning. She accepted the Frederick E. Terman Award in SMU. She serves as a reviewer in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, and IEEE Power Engineering Letters, etc.
  4. Dr. Wang has authored and/or co-authored more than 300 journal and conference publications, which have been cited for more than 20,000 times by his peers with an H-index of 72. He has been invited to give tutorials and keynote speeches at major conferences, including IEEE ISGT, IEEE SmartGridComm, IEEE SEGE, IEEE HPSC, and IGEC-XI. Dr. Wang is the past Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid and an IEEE PES Distinguished Lecturer. He is also a guest editor of Proceedings of the IEEE special issue on power grid resilience. He is the recipient of the IEEE PES Power System Operation Committee Prize Paper Award in 2015 and the 2018 Premium Award for Best Paper in IET Cyber- Physical Systems: Theory & Applications.

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Authors
Zhang, Y., Wang, J., & Chen, B.
Affiliations
  • Southern Methodist University (US)
  • Argonne National Laboratory (US)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Published
2021-01
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
623-634
ISSN
  • 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
  • 1949-3061
OpenAlex
W3044239919
Cited by
332
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 40 · 2025: 83 · 2024: 66 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 58 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 4
FWCI
17.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid (publishedVersion)
  • OSTI OAI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Electricity Theft Detection Techniques
Keywords
false data injection attacks, smart grid security, bad data detection, distribution systems, autoencoder, generative adversarial networks, anomaly detection, semi-supervised learning, measurement data, cyberattacks

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