The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Abstract
How will banks evolve as competition increases from other banks and from the capital market? Will banks become more like capital market underwriters and offer passive transaction loans or return to their roots as relationship lending experts? These are the questions we address. Our key result is that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added value for borrowers. Capital market competition reduces relationship lending (and bank lending shrinks), but each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. In both cases, welfare increases for some borrowers but not necessarily for all.
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In the citing paper
“Bank competition in Africa causes banks with low-profit margins to become more clientdriven as they raise their efficiency and expand their outreach (Boot & Thakor 2000), thereby enhancing financial services accessibility and availability.”
From Financial inclusion, bank competition and economic growth in Africa (2021) · cites this paper as Boot & Thakor 2000
Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Flagged first, then by citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2001) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002 · Cited by 2,684
“Yet, entry policies may matter more than actual entry in creating a competitive environment [Boot and Thakor (1997, 2000)].”
BackgroundRelationship Banking: What Do We Know?
Boot, A. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2000.0282 · Cited by 2,454
“For example, transaction lending is viewed as arms-length finance focusing on that particular transaction rather than being aimed at an information-intensive relationship with a customer (Boot and Thakor, 2000).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationA more complete conceptual framework for SME finance
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (2006) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.05.008 · Cited by 2,233
“However, under a different theoretical model of relationship lending, greater concentration may be associated with less credit availability using this technology (Boot and Thakor 2000).”
BackgroundBank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which is Better?Preprint
Levine, R. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.307096 · Cited by 1,786
“Boot and Thakor (2000) explore the impact of markets on banks.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V.
- Affiliations
- Tinbergen Institute (NL)
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-04
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 679-713
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2167141920
- Cited by
- 1,590
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 54 · 2025: 80 · 2024: 78 · 2023: 82 · 2022: 60 · 2021: 62 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 76 · 2018: 76 · 2017: 53 · 2016: 62 · 2015: 73 · 2014: 53 · 2013: 81 · 2012: 63
- FWCI
- 59.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking Systems and Strategies
- Keywords
- relationship banking, relationship lending, bank competition, capital market competition, bank lending, borrower welfare, underwriting
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