The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?
Abstract
This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' incentives to monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily. Even though this is true, a liquid market also makes it less costly to hold larger stakes and easier to purchase additional shares. We show that this fact is important if monitoring is costly: market liquidity mitigates the problem that small shareholders free ride on the effort of the large shareholder. We find that liquid stock markets are beneficial because they make corporate governance more effective.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x · Cited by 2,005
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.103130 · Cited by 1,902
Monitoring: Which institutions matter?
Chen, X., Harford, J., & Li, K. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.005 · Cited by 1,864
Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., & Zingales, L. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.25448 · Cited by 1,863
Metadata
- Authors
- Maug, E.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998-02
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 65-98
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2014182748
- Cited by
- 1,452
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 96.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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