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Payment Systems and Interchange Fees
Open accessAbstract
In a typical bank credit card transaction, the merchant’s bank pays an interchange fee, collectively determined by all participating banks, to the cardholder’s bank. This paper shows how the interchange fee balances charges between cardholders and merchants under imperfect competition. The privately optimal fee depends mainly on differences between cardholders’ and merchants’ banks, not their collective market power. In a non‐extreme case, the profit‐maximizing interchange fee also maximizes total output and producers’ plus consumers’ surplus. There is no economic basis for favoring proprietary payment systems, which do not need interchange fees to balance charges, over the cooperative bank card systems.
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Citations
Cited by
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Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Competition in two-sided markets
Armstrong, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x · Cited by 3,315
Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03031-7 · Cited by 1,061
Au, Y. A., & Kauffman, R. J. (2008) · Electronic Commerce Research and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.elerap.2006.12.004 · Cited by 558
One-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets
Wright, J. (2004) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1042 · Cited by 298
Metadata
- Authors
- Schmalensee, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-06
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 103-122
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6451
- OpenAlex
- W2889571040
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 37.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.