Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998). In the study reported here, groups of 3‐ and 4‐year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3‐year‐olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four‐year‐old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.
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Citations
Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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“' Materials and procedure for the Sally-Ann and Smarties tasks were as found in the standard descriptions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Gopnik & Astington, 1988).”
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Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control and Children's Theory of Mind
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“If the former, inhibitory proposal is correct, then correlations might be expected to emerge between the counterfactual inference tasks used here and other inhibitory measures of executive function (e.g. those employed by Carlson & Moses, 2001; Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994).”
InfluentialThree-year-olds’ difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit
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Cited by
The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking
Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2008) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868308316091 · Cited by 853
The bright side of being blue: depression as an adaptation for analyzing complex problems.
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“Consistent with this, the longer the causal chain, the more difficult this becomes, and people have greater difficulty generating counterfactual thoughts (R. M. J. Byrne, 1998; German & Nichols, 2003).”
Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement
Nichols, S. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195169344.001.0001 · Cited by 515
Self-citationIs memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking
De Brigard, F. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7 · Cited by 369
Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection
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Metadata
- Authors
- German, T. P., & Nichols, S.
- Venue
- Developmental Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-10-29
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 514-523
- ISSN
- 1363-755X (ISSN-L)
- 1467-7687
- OpenAlex
- W2124738104
- Cited by
- 115
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 13.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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