The DOI matches its Crossref record; 237 of the 237 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement
Abstract
This volume develops a new account of the nature of moral judgment. Evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathologies suggests that emotions play a crucial role in normal moral judgment. This indicates that philosophical accounts of moral judgment that eschew the emotions are mistaken. However, the volume also argues that prevailing philosophical accounts that embrace a role for the emotions are also mistaken. The empirical work points to a quite different account of moral judgment than philosophers have considered, an account in which normative rules and emotions make independent contributions to moral judgment. Further, the volume argues that the emotions play an important role in the normative rules that get fixed in the culture. The history of norms indicates that norms that resonate with our emotions are more likely to survive.
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Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality
Tomasello, M., & Vaish, A. (2013) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812 · Cited by 916
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
HAUSER, M., CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., KANG‐XING JIN, R., & MIKHAIL, J. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x · Cited by 666
Deeper than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and Art
Robinson, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199263655.001.0001 · Cited by 559
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Nichols, S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2004-09-23
- OpenAlex
- W4250435442
- Cited by
- 515
- References
- 237
- FWCI
- 12.88
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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