The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Minds, Modules, and Meta-Analysis
Abstract
Wellman and colleagues' meta-analysis of performance on the false-belief task is methodologically useful, but it does not lead to any theoretical progress concerning the nature of the mechanisms that underlie the existence and development of “theory of mind.” In particular, the results of this meta-analysis are perfectly compatible with “early competence” accounts that posit a specific, innate, and possibly modular basis for theory of mind. The arguments presented by Wellman and colleagues against such views stem not from their meta-analytic data, but from mistaken assumptions regarding the requirements of such theories (e.g., that there exist manipulations that improve performance only, or to a greater degree, in young children). Contrary to what Wellman and colleagues claim, their meta-analysis, while consistent with conceptual change, does not lend any new support for such theories.
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Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599 · cited 1×
“In addition, theory of mind ability is subject to specific neuropsychological impairments (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Langdon & Coltheart, 1999), is resistant to others (Varley & Siegal, in press), and recruits specific brain structures (Frith & Frith, 1999).”
BackgroundSelf-citationWimmer, H. (1983) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 · Cited by 6,305
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-2412 · Cited by 3,670
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind."
Leslie, A. M. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.4.412 · Cited by 3,379
Self-citationPretending and believing: Issues in the theory of ToMM
Leslie, A. M. (1994) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90029-9 · Cited by 740
Self-citation
Cited by
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction
SAXE, R., & WEXLER, A. (2005) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.02.013 · Cited by 926
The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults
Kovács, Á. M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1190792 · Cited by 921
Carpendale, J. I. M., & Lewis, C. (2004) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000032 · Cited by 865
Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging
Saxe, R., Carey, S., & Kanwisher, N. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044 · Cited by 726
Metadata
- Authors
- Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M.
- Venue
- Child Development
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-05-01
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 696-701
- ISSN
- 0009-3920 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8624
- OpenAlex
- W2072545276
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 11.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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