The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Explaining Action by Emotion
Abstract
I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief–desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non–inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation
Döring, S. A. (2007) · Dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01105.x · Cited by 466
Self-citationHall, T. H., & Ross, A. A. G. (2015) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818315000144 · Cited by 289
Explainable goal-driven agents and robots-a comprehensive review
Sado, F., Loo, C. K., Liew, W. S., Kerzel, M., & Wermter, S. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3564240 · Cited by 79
“, ’I expect (emotion) you would exercise regularly since I want (goal) you to be physically it, and I suspect (belief) you are not currently exercising adequately’ [38] [56].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Döring, S. A.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-04
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 211
- Pages
- 214-230
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1987734072
- Cited by
- 291
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 3.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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