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Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives
Open accessAbstract
Combining the economic literature on principal‐agent relationships with examples of marketplace innovations allows analysis of the evolution of methods for paying physicians. Agency theory and the economic principles of performance‐based compensation are applied in the context of imperfect information, risk aversion, multiple interrelated tasks, and team production efficiencies. Fee‐for‐service and capitation are flawed methods of motivating physicians to achieve specific goals. Payment innovations that blend elements of fee‐for‐service, capitation, and case rates can preserve the advantages and attenuate the disadvantages of each. These innovations include capitation with fee‐for‐service carve‐outs, department budgets with individual fee‐for‐service or “contact” capitation, and case rates for defined episodes of illness. The context within which payment incentives are embedded, includes such nonprice mechanisms as screening and monitoring and such organizational relationships as employment and ownership. The analysis has implications for health services research and public policy with respect to physician payment incentives.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Cited by
Linking physicians’ pay to the quality of care--a major experiment in the United Kingdom
Roland, M. (2004) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmhpr041294 · Cited by 689
The Lancet Global Health Commission on financing primary health care: putting people at the centre
Hanson, K., Brikci, N., Erlangga, D., Alebachew, A., De Allegri, M., Balabanova, D., Blecher, M., Cashin, C., Esperato, A., Hipgrave, D., et al. (2022) · The Lancet Global Health · doi:10.1016/s2214-109x(22)00005-5 · Cited by 525
Flodgren, G., Eccles, M. P., Shepperd, S., Scott, A., Parmelli, E., & Beyer, F. R. (2011) · Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews · doi:10.1002/14651858.cd009255 · Cited by 418
What Is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality in Health Care?
Rosenthal, M. B., & Frank, R. G. (2006) · Medical Care Research and Review · doi:10.1177/1077558705285291 · Cited by 351
From Volume To Value: Better Ways To Pay For Health Care
Miller, H. D. (2009) · Health Affairs · doi:10.1377/hlthaff.28.5.1418 · Cited by 310
Metadata
- Authors
- Robinson, J. C.
- Venue
- The Milbank Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-06
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 149-177
- ISSN
- 0887-378X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0009
- OpenAlex
- W2167536650
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 31.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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