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Cited by 418

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Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives

Open access
Robinson, James C.·2001·The Milbank Quarterly

Abstract

Combining the economic literature on principal‐agent relationships with examples of marketplace innovations allows analysis of the evolution of methods for paying physicians. Agency theory and the economic principles of performance‐based compensation are applied in the context of imperfect information, risk aversion, multiple interrelated tasks, and team production efficiencies. Fee‐for‐service and capitation are flawed methods of motivating physicians to achieve specific goals. Payment innovations that blend elements of fee‐for‐service, capitation, and case rates can preserve the advantages and attenuate the disadvantages of each. These innovations include capitation with fee‐for‐service carve‐outs, department budgets with individual fee‐for‐service or “contact” capitation, and case rates for defined episodes of illness. The context within which payment incentives are embedded, includes such nonprice mechanisms as screening and monitoring and such organizational relationships as employment and ownership. The analysis has implications for health services research and public policy with respect to physician payment incentives.

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Metadata

Authors
Robinson, J. C.
Venue
The Milbank Quarterly
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001-06
Volume
79
Issue
2
Pages
149-177
ISSN
  • 0887-378X (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0009
OpenAlex
W2167536650
Cited by
418
References
2
FWCI
31.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0009.00202
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Robinson, J. C. (2001). Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives. The Milbank Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0009.00202

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.