The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality in Health Care?
Abstract
Despite more than a decade of benchmarking and public reporting of quality problems in the health care sector, changes in medical practice have been slow to materialize. To accelerate quality improvement, many private and public payers have begun to offer financial incentives to physicians and hospitals based on their performance on clinical and service quality measures. The authors review the empirical literature on paying for quality in health care and comparable interventions in other sectors. They find little evidence to support the effectiveness of paying for quality. The absence of findings for an effect may be attributable to the small size of the bonuses studied and the fact that payers often accounted for only a fraction of the targeted provider's panel. Even in nonhealth settings, however, where the institutional features are more favorable to a positive impact, the literature contains mixed results on the effectiveness of analogous pay-for-performance schemes.
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Cited by
Executive Leadership and Physician Well-being
Shanafelt, T. D., & Noseworthy, J. H. (2017) · Mayo Clinic Proceedings · doi:10.1016/j.mayocp.2016.10.004 · Cited by 1,776
Early Experience With Pay-for-Performance: From Concept to Practice
Rosenthal, M. B., Frank, R. G., Li, Z., & Epstein, A. M. (2005) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.294.14.1788 · Cited by 623
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The Long-Term Effect of Premier Pay for Performance on Patient Outcomes
Jha, A. K., Joynt, K. E., Orav, E. J., & Epstein, A. M. (2012) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmsa1112351 · Cited by 306
Pay for Performance at the Tipping Point
Epstein, A. M. (2007) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejme078002 · Cited by 276
Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, M. B., & Frank, R. G.
- Venue
- Medical Care Research and Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-04
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-157
- ISSN
- 1077-5587 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-6801
- OpenAlex
- W2113041460
- Cited by
- 351
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 62.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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