The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account
Abstract
[Introduction] The nomothetic conception of explanation, according to which all successful explanations must appeal to laws, has dominated the discussion of scientific explanation in the second half of the twentieth century. The best known formulation of the nomothetic conception of explanation is, of course, Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological theory of explanation. While few philosophers today accept the D-N theory of explanation in its original formulation, there is widespread consensus that laws play a central role in explanation, even among prominent critics of the D-N model such as Wesley Salmon (see, e.g., Salmon 1984, p. 262).
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Citations
Cites
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Scheines, R. (1993) · Lecture Notes in Statistics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2748-9 · Cited by 4,617
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-5840 · Cited by 3,371
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.
Resnik, M. D., & Hempel, C. G. (1966) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2106169 · Cited by 3,319
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World
Salmon, W. C. (2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh · Cited by 2,007
Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science
Hempel, C. G. (1965) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,843
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
Lewis, D. (1979) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215339 · Cited by 1,610
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Self-citationFour Decades of Scientific Explanation
SALMON, W. C. (2006) · University of Pittsburgh Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt5vkdm7 · Cited by 1,224
Lewis, D. (2000) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2678389 · Cited by 928
Cited by
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Self-citationUnderstanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
Khalifa, K. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108164276 · Cited by 331
Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth
Hitchcock, C., & Woodward, J. (2003) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00435 · Cited by 256
Self-citationInterventionist causal models in psychiatry: repositioning the mind–body problem
Kendler, K. S., & Campbell, J. (2009) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291708004467 · Cited by 173
Model agnostic generation of counterfactual explanations for molecules
Wellawatte, G. P., Seshadri, A., & White, A. D. (2022) · Chemical Science · doi:10.1039/d1sc05259d · Cited by 143
Metadata
- Authors
- Woodward, J., & Hitchcock, C.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-02-12
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-24
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W2032972890
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 40.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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