The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
Abstract
Document de travail IDEI ; 75 (C13 IDEI 75) Diffusion du document : IDEI Manufacture des Tabacs 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse (FRA) 75
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?
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Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity
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Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications
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Self-citationChapter 34 Price Discrimination and Competition
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Metadata
- Authors
- Biais, B., Martimort, D., & Rochet, J.-C.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2000-07
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 799-837
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2143321150
- Cited by
- 353
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 18.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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