The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
Open accessAbstract
This paper investigates belief learning. Unlike other investigators who have been forced to use observable proxies to approximate unobserved beliefs, we have, using a belief elicitation procedure (proper scoring rule), elicited subject beliefs directly. As a result we were able to perform a more direct test of the proposition that people behave in a manner consistent with belief learning. What we find is interesting. First to the extent that subjects tend to “belief learn,” the beliefs they use are the stated beliefs we elicit from them and not the “empirical beliefs” posited by fictitious play or Cournot models. Second, we present evidence that the stated beliefs of our subjects differ dramatically, both quantitatively and qualitatively, from the type of empirical or historical beliefs usually used as proxies for them. Third, our belief elicitation procedures allow us to examine how far we can be led astray when we are forced to infer the value of parameters using observable proxies for variables previously thought to be unobservable. By transforming a heretofore unobservable into an observable, we can see directly how parameter estimates change when this new information is introduced. Again, we demonstrate that such differences can be dramatic. Finally, our belief learning model using stated beliefs outperforms both a reinforcement and EWA model when all three models are estimated using our data.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.6.i · Cited by 7,220
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses
Vuong, Q. H. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912557 · Cited by 5,929
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,545
Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis.
Cane, V., & Luce, R. D. (1960) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2343282 · Cited by 2,504
Post, L. T. (1937) · American Journal of Ophthalmology · doi:10.1016/s0002-9394(37)94142-4 · Cited by 2,081
Stochastic models for learning.
Bush, R. R., & Mosteller, F. (1955) · John Wiley & Sons, Inc. eBooks · doi:10.1037/14496-000 · Cited by 1,511
Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
Camerer, C., & Hua Ho, T. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00054 · Cited by 1,487
Individual choice behavior: A theoretical analysis.
Luce, R. D. (2005) · doi:10.1037/14396-000 · Cited by 1,157
Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals
Kline, L. W., & Thorndike, E. L. (1898) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1412682 · Cited by 1,092
Camerer, C. (2020) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5.12 · Cited by 992
Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods
Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., & Schram, A. (1996) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235360 · Cited by 407
Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results
Cheung, Y.-W., & Friedman, D. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0544 · Cited by 350
Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule
Selten, R. (1998) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01426214 · Cited by 337
Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
O'Neill, B. (1987) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.84.7.2106 · Cited by 266
Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human Agents: A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality
Arthur, W. B. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 259
Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game
Mookherjee, D., & Sopher, B. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1037 · Cited by 252
Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-Examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment
Brown, J. N., & Rosenthal, R. W. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938300 · Cited by 173
Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling
McKelvey, R. D., & Page, T. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938318 · Cited by 169
Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games
Feltovich, N. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00125 · Cited by 168
Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games
Dilip Mookherjee, B., & Sopher, B. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0540 · Cited by 165
Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis
Rapoport, A., & Boebel, R. B. (1992) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(92)90019-o · Cited by 104
Notes—Discovering Personal Probabilities When Utility Functions are Unknown
Allen, F. (1987) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.33.4.542 · Cited by 80
Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis
Shachat, J. M. (2002) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2915 · Cited by 74
Beliefs and Decision Rules in Public Good Games
Offerman, T. (1997) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-2654-1 · Cited by 66
(1998) · American Economic Review
Cited by
Manski, C. F. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00537.x · Cited by 1,404
Conspicuous Consumption and Sophisticated Thinking
Amaldoss, W., & Jain, S. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0399 · Cited by 427
Experimental methods: Pay one or pay all
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Halladay, B. (2016) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.010 · Cited by 380
Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., & Riedl, A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1335 · Cited by 373
The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments
Gächter, S., & Renner, E. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9246-4 · Cited by 359
Metadata
- Authors
- Nyarko, Y., & Schotter, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 971-1005
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2112828991
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 33.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.