The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments
Abstract
Belief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.
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Citations
Cites
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
Self-citationAntisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Cited by
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.541 · Cited by 1,316
Self-citationTrust, conflict, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.
Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0030939 · Cited by 659
Fooled twice: People cannot detect deepfakes but think they can
Köbis, N. C., Doležalová, B., & Soraperra, I. (2021) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.103364 · Cited by 193
Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions?
Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., Persson, E., & Wang, X. (2016) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.007 · Cited by 31
“The subjects were monetarily rewarded depending on the accuracy of their guesses as in Gächter and Renner (2010).”
MethodFooled twice – people cannot detect deepfakes but think they can
Köbis, N., Doležalová, B., & Soraperra, I. (2021) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3832978 · Cited by 194
Metadata
- Authors
- Gächter, S., & Renner, E.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2010-09
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 364-377
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2136710049
- Cited by
- 359
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 56.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gächter, S., & Renner, E. (2010). The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9246-4
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