On Modes of Economic Governance
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners' dilemmas between pairs of players selected from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement. I examine how profit-maximizing private intermediation can supply the information and enforcement. I obtain conditions under which private governance can improve upon no governance, and examine why it fails to achieve social optimality.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., & Weingast*, B. R. (1990) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x · Cited by 1,793
Social Norms and Community Enforcement
Kandori, M. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297925 · Cited by 1,574
Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
Ellison, G. (1994) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297904 · Cited by 456
Cited by
What Determines Corporate Transparency?
BUSHMAN, R. M., PIOTROSKI, J. D., & SMITH, A. J. (2004) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00136.x · Cited by 2,176
On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society
Hurrell, A. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233106.001.0001 · Cited by 677
Governance Institutions and Economic Activity
Dixit, A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.5 · Cited by 575
Self-citationRelational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
Brown, M., Falk, A., & Fehr, E. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00511.x · Cited by 461
Elections and the timing of devaluations
Stein, E. H., & Streb, J. M. (2004) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00040-0 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Dixit, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2003-03
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 449-481
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W3123595993
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 32.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.