The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Long Cheap Talk
Abstract
With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message—even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. (“Cheap talk” means plain conversation—unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted.
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Cited by
When Does Coordination Require Centralization?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aumann, R. J., & Hart, S.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2003-11
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1619-1660
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2019681493
- Cited by
- 282
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 21.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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