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Economic Theories of Voter Turnout

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Dhillon, Amrita, Peralta, Susana · 2002 · The Economic Journal
Cited by 172

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The rationality of voting is the Achilles' heel of rational choice theory in political science. (Aldrich, 1997) In modern democracies thousands of citizens are eligible to vote in each election. An individual vote cast in such an election will conceivably have a negligible effect on its outcome. This leads to three interesting paradoxes: (i)The voting paradox Why would the rational individual bother to spend time and ;resources to become well informed, go to the polls on the election day and maybe even wait in a queue? Why would a rational voter vote? (Downs, 1957) (ii)The paradox of indeterminacy If they vote why do they care who they vote for? (Kirchgassner, 1992; Kirchgassner and Pommerehne, 1993) (iii)The paradox of ignorance To the extent that information is costly, the rational voter must be ignorant about relevant aspects of his decision making (Downs, 1957). The answer to this last question has serious implications. If the only alternative one is left with is to label the voter as an irrational individual, then how can democracy and its institutions be defended and studied on rational grounds? Moreover, what will be the normative properties of social equilibria stemming from voting institutions, if individuals have a basic incentive to abstain, and the ones who vote are not rational? This would imply a fundamental flaw in the voting system, if indeed the models capture reality!

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Metadata

Authors
Dhillon, A., & Peralta, S.
Venue
The Economic Journal
Published
2002-06-01
Volume
112
Issue
480
Pages
F332-F352
ISSN
  • 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0297
OpenAlex
W1972030646
Cited by
172
References
22
FWCI
6.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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