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National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic
Open accessAbstract
We present a hold‐up model of investment where active industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Since corruption deters investment, the effect of industrial policy on investment is lower than when corruption is absent. We find evidence suggesting that corruption is indeed higher in countries pursuing active industrial policies. Policy implications are illustrated by decomposing the total effect of industrial policy into a positive, direct effect, and a negative, corruption‐induced effect. In the presence of corruption, the total effect of industrial policy on investment ranges between 84 and 56% of the direct impact. The magnitude of these corrections suggests that corruption considerations should not be absent from cost‐benefit analyses of industrial policies.
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
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Competition and Corporate Performance
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Cited by
Tanzi, V. (1998) · Staff Papers · doi:10.2139/ssrn.882334 · Cited by 2,048
Rents, Competition, and Corruption
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.982 · Cited by 1,763
Self-citationDecentralization and corruption: evidence across countries
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00158-4 · Cited by 1,309
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.08.005 · Cited by 1,204
Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ades, A. F., & Tella, R. D.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 1997-07-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 443
- Pages
- 1023-1042
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2089797611
- Cited by
- 488
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 48.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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