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Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach
Abstract
We consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments. Contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes. We find that: (1) It may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully. (2) Less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption. (3) There may exist a ‘free‐lunch’ such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption, increase investment, and achieve a better allocation of talent.
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Citations
Cited by
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517
The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption
Acemoglu, D., & Verdier, T. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.194 · Cited by 822
Self-citationProperty Rights and Economic Development*
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00006-9 · Cited by 646
Baland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
Corruption, growth and political regimes: Cross country evidence
Méndez, F., & Sepúlveda, F. (2006) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.04.005 · Cited by 470
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., & Verdier, T.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-09-01
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 450
- Pages
- 1381-1403
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2103776815
- Cited by
- 619
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 28.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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