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Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes
Abstract
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes.
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Cites
Crawford, S. E. S., & Ostrom, E. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082975 · Cited by 1,362
Cited by
(2002) · National Academies Press eBooks · doi:10.17226/10287 · Cited by 1,125
Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1400106x · Cited by 639
Hauser, O. P., Rand, D. G., Peysakhovich, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2014) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature13530 · Cited by 378
Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., & Riedl, A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1335 · Cited by 373
The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources
Ostrom, E. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.008 · Cited by 285
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Metadata
- Authors
- Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Herr, A., & Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-01-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 460
- Pages
- 212-234
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2063159696
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 16.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Herr, A., & Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00497
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