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Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

Walker, J. M., Gardner, Roy, Herr, Andrew, Ostrom, Elinor · 2000 · The Economic Journal

Abstract

We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes.

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Metadata

Authors
Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Herr, A., & Ostrom, E.
Venue
The Economic Journal
Published
2000-01-01
Volume
110
Issue
460
Pages
212-234
ISSN
  • 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0297
OpenAlex
W2063159696
Cited by
217
References
1
FWCI
16.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0297.00497
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Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Herr, A., & Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00497

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