Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other's projects that lenders do not. We show that joint‐liability lending contracts, similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group‐lending schemes, will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information. This can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable.
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Cites
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Cited by
Financial performance and Outreach: A Global Analysis of Leading Microbanks
Cull, R., Demirgu¨ç‐Kunt, A., & Morduch, J. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02017.x · Cited by 1,012
The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice
Ghatak, M., & Guinnane, T. W. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00041-3 · Cited by 879
Self-citationGroup lending, local information and peer selection
Ghatak, M. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00035-8 · Cited by 720
Self-citationSocial Connections and Group Banking
Karlan, D. S. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02015.x · Cited by 501
The Impacts of Microfinance: Evidence from Joint-Liability Lending in Mongolia
Attanasio, O., Augsburg, B., De Haas, R., Fitzsimons, E., & Harmgart, H. (2015) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20130489 · Cited by 431
Metadata
- Authors
- Ghatak, M.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-07-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 465
- Pages
- 601-631
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2066578681
- Cited by
- 416
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 15.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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