The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making*
Abstract
This paper models a two-person family. Each family member is utility maximising, yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family. The two family members’ interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non-cooperative, or Cournot–Nash, game theoretic framework. The Cournot–Nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game. The paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands, a full analysis of the determinants of intra-household resource allocation, including the effect of varying household bargaining power, and consideration of policy implications.
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Citations
Cites
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“4 Andreoni's (1990) work explains the existence of privately provided public goods in large economies by suggesting that people give, not because of caring, but because they receive a 'warm glow' from the act of giving.”
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Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach
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A Field of One's Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia.
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Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.4.139 · Cited by 1,205
Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation
Browning, M., Bourguignon, F., Chiappori, P.-A., & Lechene, V. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261964 · Cited by 1,070
Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions
Sugden, R. (1984) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232294 · Cited by 965
A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households
Pollak, R. A. (1985) · Journal of Economic Literature · Cited by 739
The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior
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A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries
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What’s Mine is Yours? The Influence of Male and Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditure
Phipps, S. A., & Burton, P. S. (1998) · Economica · doi:10.1111/1468-0335.00148 · Cited by 396
A Survey of Theories of the FamilyPreprint
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Collective models of household behavior
Bourguignon, F., & Chiappori, P.-A. (1992) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(92)90091-a · Cited by 275
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ARE BETTER OFF HOUSEHOLDS MORE UNEQUAL OR LESS UNEQUAL?
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Cited by
What determines female autonomy? Evidence from Bangladesh
Anderson, S., & Eswaran, M. (2009) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.10.004 · Cited by 589
Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results
Vermeulen, F. (2002) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00177 · Cited by 336
Domestic violence and women's autonomy in developing countries: theory and evidence
Eswaran, M., & Malhotra, N. (2011) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01673.x · Cited by 282
The Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour
Breen, R. (2005) · European Sociological Review · doi:10.1093/esr/jci003 · Cited by 258
Gender Bias in Parental Investments in Children’s Education: A Theoretical Analysis
Pasqua, S. (2005) · Review of Economics of the Household · doi:10.1007/s11150-005-3459-x · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, Z., & Woolley, F.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-10-01
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 474
- Pages
- 722-748
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2125868487
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 24.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.