The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Impact of SFAS No. 131 on Information and Monitoring
Abstract
We investigate the effect of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) new segment reporting standard on the information and monitoring environment. We compare hand‐collected, restated SFAS 131 segment data for the final SFAS 14 fiscal year with the historical SFAS 14 data. We find that SFAS 131 increased the number of reported segments and provided more disaggregated information. Analysts and the market had access to a portion of the new segment information before it was made public, but analyst and market expectations were still altered by the mandated release of the new data. By increasing information disaggregation, the new standard induced firms to reveal previously “hidden” information about their diversification strategies. The newly revealed information affected market valuations and lead to changes in firm behavior consistent with improved monitoring following adoption of SFAS 131.
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“In a segment reporting setting, Berger and Hann (2003, 2007) find that firm managers have incentives to conceal bad performance by aggregating segments incurring losses with profitable segments in order to avoid shareholder scrutiny.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Berger, P. G., & Hann, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-04-04
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 163-223
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2057785092
- Cited by
- 452
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 29.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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