The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Informational Feedback, Adverse Selection, and Optimal Disclosure Policy
Abstract
Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.
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Citations
Cites
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Verrecchia, R. E. (1983) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3 · Cited by 3,481
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261893 · Cited by 1,719
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330041371321 · Cited by 889
Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2327326 · Cited by 286
Cited by
Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review
Blankespoor, E., deHaan, E., & Marinovic, I. (2020) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101344 · Cited by 1,076
Information Disclosure in Financial Markets
Goldstein, I., & Yang, L. (2017) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110716-032355 · Cited by 409
Good disclosure, bad disclosure
Goldstein, I., & Yang, L. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.004 · Cited by 338
The source of information in prices and investment-price sensitivity
Edmans, A., Jayaraman, S., & Schneemeier, J. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.017 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- GAO, P., & LIANG, P. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-09-03
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1133-1158
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W1930256002
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 31.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.