The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A New Measure of Disclosure Quality: The Level of Disaggregation of Accounting Data in Annual Reports
Open accessAbstract
We construct a new, parsimonious, measure of disclosure quality—disaggregation quality (DQ)—and offer validation tests. DQ captures the level of disaggregation of accounting data through a count of nonmissing Compustat line items, and reflects the extent of details in firms’ annual reports. Conceptually, DQ differs from existing disclosure measures in that it captures the “fineness” of data and is based on a comprehensive set of accounting line items in annual reports. Unlike existing measures, which are usually applicable for a subset of firms or are based on a subset of information items, DQ can be generated for the universe of Compustat industrial firms. We conduct three sets of validation tests by examining DQ's association with variables predicted by prior literature to be associated with information quality. DQ is negatively (positively) associated with analyst forecast dispersion (accuracy) and negatively associated with bid‐ask spreads and cost of equity. These associations continue to hold after we control for firm fundamentals. Taken together, results from this battery of validation tests are consistent with our measure capturing disclosure quality.
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Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
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Metadata
- Authors
- CHEN, S., MIAO, B., & SHEVLIN, T.
- Affiliations
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- University of California, Irvine (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-10-30
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1017-1054
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W3124047462
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 35 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 6
- FWCI
- 77.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Accounting Research (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Financial Reporting and XBRL
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting
- Keywords
- disclosure quality, information quality, analyst forecast dispersion, forecast accuracy, bid-ask spread, cost of equity, financial reporting
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