The DOI matches its Crossref record; 123 of the 123 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective
Open accessAbstract
This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.
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Cites
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Cited by
Firm climate risk, risk management, and bank loan financing
Huang, H. H., Kerstein, J., Wang, C., & Wu, F. (. (2022) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3437 · Cited by 384
Banks’ Financial Reporting and Financial System Stability
ACHARYA, V. V., & RYAN, S. G. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12114 · Cited by 354
Metadata
- Authors
- CHRISTENSEN, H. B., NIKOLAEV, V. V., & WITTENBERG‐MOERMAN, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-03-29
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 397-435
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2580010294
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 123
- FWCI
- 57.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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