The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?
Open accessAbstract
Although the question of whether constitutional rights matter is of great theoretical and practical importance, little is known about whether constitutional rights impact government behavior. In this article, we test the effectiveness of six political rights. We hypothesize that a difference exists between organizational rights—most notably, the rights to unionize and form political parties—and individual rights. Specifically, we suggest that organizational rights increase de facto rights protection because they create organizations with the incentives and means to protect the underlying right, which renders these rights self‐enforcing. Such organizations are not necessarily present to protect individual rights, which could make individual rights less effective. We test our theory using a variety of statistical methods on a data set of constitutional rights for 186 countries. The results support our theory: Organizational rights are associated with increased de facto rights protection, while individual rights are not.
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Cites
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Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis
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The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
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Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564
What to do about missing values in time series cross- section data
Honaker, J., & King, G. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00447.x · Cited by 966
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability
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Cited by
Melton, J., & Ginsburg, T. (2014) · Journal of Law and Courts · doi:10.1086/676999 · Cited by 266
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
Metadata
- Authors
- Chilton, A. S., & Versteeg, M.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-12-23
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 575-589
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2474066115
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 39.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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